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Abstract
We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from
matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. Even if
the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in
applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly
by some ex-ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible
and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite
school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in
simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach
is more appropriate in real-life settings.
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The past decade has seen the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) becoming the
leading centralized mechanism for the placement of students to public schools at every
education level, and it is now used by many education systems around the world, including
Amsterdam, Boston, Hungary, New York, Paris, and Taiwan.
One of the reasons for the growing popularity of DA is its strategy-proofness (Abdul-
kadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). When applying for admission, students are asked to submit
rank-order lists (ROLs) of schools, and it is in their best interest to rank schools truthfully.
Students and their parents are thus released from strategic considerations. Consequently,
DA also provides policymakers “with more credible data about school choices, or parent
‘demand’ for particular schools,” as argued by Thomas Payzant (former Boston Public
Schools superintendent). Indeed, such rank-ordered data contain rich information on
student preferences over schools, and are increasingly used in the empirical literature.
Due to the strategy-proofness of DA, one may be tempted to assume that the sub-
mitted ROLs reveal students’ true preferences over schools. However, this truth-telling
assumption can be restrictive in settings where students face only limited uncertainty
about their admission outcomes. One such environment is the “strict-priority” setting
in which schools rank students by some priority index, e.g., a test score, which is known
to students when submitting their ROL. Consider a student who likes a highly selective
school but has a low test score. The student may “skip the impossible” and choose not
to apply to this school, as she rationally expects a zero admission probability based on
available information such as past admission outcomes. This implies that not all students
have strong incentives to rank all schools truthfully in their ROLs.1
Based on theoretical investigations of student incentive and behavior, we aim to pro-
vide empirical approaches to estimating student preferences in the strict-priority setting,
which remains largely unexplored in the empirical literature on school choice and col-
lege admissions. Our proposed approaches can potentially be applied in many real-life
systems, such as those in Table 1, including school choice in Finland, Paris, and Turkey
(Panel A) as well as college admissions in Chile, Norway, and Taiwan (Panel B).
The paper’s first contribution is to clarify the implications of the truth-telling as-
sumption, which hypothesizes that students always report true preferences. Given the
1In contrast, students can be more uncertain about their admission outcomes if (i) schools use lotteries
to break ties ex post, or (ii) schools rank students by test scores that are ex ante unknown. In these
cases, the aforementioned student may choose to apply to the highly selective school, since uncertainty
in priority indices implies that admission probabilities are rarely zero ex ante.
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Table 1: Centralized School Choice and College Admissions based on the Deferred
Acceptance Mechanism with Strict Priority Indices: Examples
Country/city Assignment mechanism Choice restrictions Sources
Panel A. Secondary Education
Boston (selective schools)a Student-proposing DA Unrestricted Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014)
Chicago (selective schools)a DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices Pathak and So¨nmez (2013)
NYC (selective schools)a DA (Serial dictatorship)c Unrestricted Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014)
Finland School-proposing DA Up to 5 choices Salonen (2014)
Ghana DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices Ajayi (2017)
Paris School-proposing DA Up to 8 choices Hiller and Tercieux (2014)
Romania DA (Serial dictatorship)c Unrestricted Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013)
Singapore DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices Teo et al. (2001)
Turkey DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 12 choices Akyol and Krishna (2017)
Panel B. Higher Education
Australia (Victoria) College-proposing DA Up to 12 choices Artemov et al. (2017)
Chile Student-proposing DA Up to 10 choices Hastings et al. (2013)
Hungary Student-proposing DA Unrestrictedb Biro´ (2011)
Ireland College-proposing DA Up to 10 choices Chen (2012)
Norway College-proposing DA Up to 15 choices Kirkebøen et al. (2016)
Spain Student-proposing DA Region-specific Mora and Romero-Medina (2001)
Taiwan College-proposing DA Up to 100 choices UAC (2014)
Tunisia College-proposing DA Up to 10 choices Luflade (2018)
Turkey College-proposing DA Up to 24 choices Saygin (2013)
Notes: a For exam schools in Boston, selective enrollment high schools in Chicago, and specialized high schools in NYC,
strict priority indices are used in the admission. In contrast, admissions to other schools often do not use strict priority
indices. b In Hungary, students may apply for any number of programs but they are charged a fee (of approximately
10 euros) for every program after the third application. c In all of the countries/cities listed in this table, students’
priorities are based on various combinations of grades, entrance/exit exams, and other criteria (aptitude tests, interviews,
etc.). When priority indices are not school-specific, i.e., schools/universities rank students in the same way, DA, whether
student-proposing or school/college-proposing, is equivalent to serial dictatorship, under which students, in the order of
their priority indices, are allowed to choose among the remaining schools or universities.
flourishing empirical literature on the setting in which schools rank students with post-
application lotteries (Pathak and Shi, 2014; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2017), it is natural to
extend those truth-telling-based approaches to the strict-priority setting. Unfortunately,
strategy-proofness implies that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy, leaving open
the issue of multiple equilibria because a student may obtain the same outcome by opt-
ing for non-truth-telling strategies—as shown in the “skipping the impossible” example
above. Making truth-telling even less likely, many applications of DA restrict the length
of submittable ROLs, which destroys strategy-proofness (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
These arguments are formalized in a theoretical model. Deviating from the literature,
we introduce an application cost that students incur when submitting ROLs, and the
model therefore has the common real-life applications of DA as special cases. Conditional
on both preferences and priorities being private information, we show that for truth-telling
to be the unique equilibrium, two conditions are needed: no application cost and large
uncertainty in admission outcomes. Neither is easily satisfied in the strict-priority setting.
Even without limits on the length of submittable ROLs, students may find it costly to
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rank a long list of schools. As students know their own priority indices, uncertainty about
admission outcomes can also be limited.
Going beyond truth-telling, the paper’s second contribution is to propose a set of novel
empirical approaches that are theoretically founded. We consider a weaker assumption
implied by truth-telling: stability, or justified-envy-freeness, of the matching (Abdul-
kadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), meaning that every student is matched with her favorite
feasible school. A school is feasible for a student if its ex post cutoff is below the student’s
priority index. These cutoffs are well-defined and often observable to the researcher: given
the admission outcome, each school’s cutoff is the lowest priority index of the students
accepted there. Conditional on the cutoffs, stability therefore defines a discrete choice
model with personalized choice sets, which is straightforward to analyze empirically.
We show that stability is a plausible assumption, as there exists an equilibrium out-
come that is asymptotically stable under certain conditions. When school capacities and
the number of students increase proportionally while the number of schools is fixed, the
fraction of students not matched with their favorite feasible school tends to zero. Al-
though stability, as an ex post optimality condition, is not guaranteed when students’
information is incomplete, we provide numerical evidence suggesting that typical real-life
markets are sufficiently large for stability to be almost exactly satisfied.
Based on the theoretical results, we propose a menu of approaches for preference esti-
mation. We start by formalizing the truth-telling assumption under which one can apply
rank-ordered models on submitted ROLs. In practice, students rarely rank all available
schools, and, therefore, the truth-telling assumption often imposes the exogeneity of the
length of a submitted ROL.2
Stability, but not asymptotic stability, leads to a discrete choice model with personal-
ized choice sets, so the nonparametric identification in the discrete-choice literature can be
applied (e.g., Matzkin, 1993), under the assumption that priority indices and unobserved
preference heterogeneity are independent conditional on observables. An advantage of
this approach is that it enables estimation with data on admission outcomes only, al-
though ignoring the information in ROLs entails some efficiency loss in the estimation.
We also provide a solution if neither truth-telling nor stability is satisfied: as long
2Hence, we distinguish strict from weak truth-telling. The former assumes that every student ranks
all schools truthfully, while the latter requires students to rank their most-preferred schools truthfully
and allows them to omit the least-preferred schools.
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as students do not play dominated strategies, the submitted ROLs reveal true partial
preference orders of schools (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009),3 allowing us to derive probability
bounds for one school being preferred to another. The corresponding moment inequalities
can be used for inference (for a survey, see Tamer, 2010). When stability is satisfied and
identifies student preferences, these inequalities provide over-identifying information that
can improve estimation efficiency (Moon and Schorfheide, 2009).
To guide the choice between these identifying assumptions, we consider several statisti-
cal tests, provided that the model is correctly specified and identified. Truth-telling, lead-
ing to more restrictions than stability, can be tested against stability using a Hausman-
type test (Hausman, 1978) or a test of over-identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). Sim-
ilarly, stability can be tested against undominated strategies: if the outcome is unstable,
the stability restrictions are incompatible with the moment inequalities implied by un-
dominated strategies, allowing us to use tests such as Bugni et al. (2015).
Our third contribution is to evaluate the performance of each approach based on
simulated and real-life data. Having illustrated the main theoretical results with Monte
Carlo simulations, we apply the empirical approaches to school choice data from Paris.
There are 1,590 middle school students applying for admissions to 11 academic-track high
schools in Paris’ Southern District through a version of DA. Schools rank applicants by
their academic grades but give priority to low-income students. The findings are more
consistent with stability than truth-telling. Our proposed statistical tests reject truth-
telling in favor of stability but fail to reject stability against undominated strategies.
The tests, however, do not provide definitive proof against truth-telling, since they are
conditional on the model’s parametric assumptions. Additionally, we provide reduced-
form evidence on students’ ranking behavior suggesting that some students may have
omitted the most selective schools from their ROLs because of low admission probabilities.
Moreover, the truth-telling-based estimator is outperformed by the stability-based one
when it comes to predicting admission outcomes and student preferences.
To highlight the differences between the proposed approaches and their underlying
behavioral assumptions, we summarize the theoretical results and describe the nesting
structure of the assumptions in Section 5. We also emphasize the key features of school
choice and college admissions in practice that can help researchers to choose the most
3An ROL is a true partial preference order if the listed schools are ranked according to true preferences.
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appropriate empirical approach to preference estimation.
Other Related Literature. Since the seminal work of Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003), the theoretical study of student behavior and matching properties under DA
has been extensive, and large-market asymptotics are a common analytical tool (see the
survey by Kojima, 2015). Closely related to our study is Azevedo and Leshno (2016),
who show the asymptotics of stable matchings. Our paper extends theirs to outcomes of
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereas they assume that students are always truth-telling.
There is a burgeoning literature on preference estimation using centralized school
choice data. One strand of this literature uses data from settings in which researchers
argue that truth-telling behavior by students is plausible. For example, Hastings et al.
(2008) use data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg public school district, and Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al. (2017) study school choice data from New York City, which is a “lottery” setting.4
Both papers estimate student preferences under the assumption that students truthfully
report their preferences. In the same spirit, assuming students report their true prefer-
ences in surveys, Budish and Cantillon (2012) and De Haan et al. (2015) use reported
student ordinal preferences to conduct analysis without estimating preferences.
The second strand of the empirical literature explicitly considers students’ strategic
behavior when estimating student preferences, especially if the mechanism is not strategy-
proof, e.g., the (Boston) immediate-acceptance mechanism (Calsamiglia et al., 2014; He,
2015; Hwang, 2014; Kapor et al., 2016; Agarwal and Somaini, 2018). In those settings,
observed ROLs are sometimes considered as solutions to the maximization of students’
expected utility. Avoiding some difficulties of this strategy-based approach, we instead
propose methods that rely on equilibrium outcome of the school choice game.5
As to the strict-priority setting, there are only a handful of empirical studies (Burgess
et al., 2014; Ajayi, 2017; Akyol and Krishna, 2017). Most of them use ad-hoc solutions
to the potential problem of students’ non-truth-telling behavior.6 Akyol and Krishna
4The authors perform robustness checks, e.g., only considering students’ top three submitted choices.
5With assumptions on students’ beliefs, the strategy-based approach formulates a discrete choice
problem defined on the set of possible ROLs. It faces some challenges: (i) Degenerate admission proba-
bilities can occur, leading to multiple equilibria (He, 2015). (ii) Application costs, especially those related
to cognitive load, are often unobservable, necessitating additional assumptions in the maximization of
expected utility. (iii) A given ROL is evaluated against a large number of alternative ROLs, sometimes
creating computational burden (e.g., there exist S!{pS Kq! lists ranking 1 ¤ K ¤ S schools).
6Analyzing school choice in the U.K., where proximity to schools breaks ties in determining admission
to oversubscribed primary schools, Burgess et al. (2014) restrict each student’s set of schools to those in
close proximity to the student’s residence. In the context of admissions to secondary schools in Ghana,
where exam scores determine priority, Ajayi (2017) considers a subset of schools with similar selectivity.
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(2017) is an exception. Observing the outcome and the cutoffs of high school admissions
in Turkey, the authors estimate preferences based on the assumption that every student
is assigned to her favorite feasible school, which amounts to assuming stability of the
matching. We formalize and clarify this stability assumption, along with other extensions.
Although stability is a rather common identifying assumption in the two-sided matching
literature (see the surveys by Fox, 2009; Chiappori and Salanie´, 2016),7 it is new in
empirical studies of school choice and college admissions.
Lastly, estimation of student preferences with college admissions data is under-explored,
often due to the decentralized nature of the admission process. Among centralized ad-
missions, however, there are many applications of the DA mechanism (see Table 1).8 The
specifics of the mechanism have led to numerous studies on the causal effects of educa-
tion (e.g., Hastings et al., 2015; Kirkebøen et al., 2016), but few on preference estimation.
One exception is Kirkebøen (2012) who uses the truth-telling assumption while excluding
from a student’s choice set every college program at which the student does not meet the
formal requirements or is below its previous-year cutoff. Another is Bucarey (2018) who
applies our stability-based estimator to evaluate the crowding-out effects of free college
tuition for low-income students in Chile.
Organization of the Paper. Section 1 presents the model and the theoretical
foundation. Section 2 formalizes the empirical approaches and tests, which are illustrated
in Monte Carlo simulations in Section 3. School choice in Paris and the empirical results
are shown in Section 4. Section 5 discusses practical considerations for applying the
approaches to data and outlines some extensions. We conclude in Section 6.
1 The Model
To study student behavior, we extend the model in Azevedo and Leshno (2016). An econ-
omy, as a school choice/college admissions problem, consists of a finite set of schools/colleges,
S  t1, . . . , Su, and a set of students. Student i has a type θi  pui, eiq P Θ  r0, 1sS 
r0, 1sS, where ui  pui,1,    , ui,Sq P r0, 1sS is a vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utilities of being assigned to schools, and ei  pei,1,    , ei,Sq P r0, 1sS is a vector
of priority indices at schools, a student with a higher index having a higher priority at
7This literature usually considers decentralized matching markets; Agarwal (2015) is an exception.
8Some centralized college admissions do not use DA, e.g., Brazil (Carvalho et al., 2014).
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a school. To simplify notation, we assume that all schools and students are acceptable.9
Students are matched with schools through a centralized mechanism.
The continuum economy with a unit mass of students is denoted by E  tG, q, Cu,
whereG is an atomless probability measure over Θ representing the distribution of student
types; q  pq1,    , qSq are masses of seats available at each school, where qs P p0, 1q for
all s; lastly, C is an application cost, to be specified shortly. G being atomless implies a
measure-zero set of students with indifference in either utilities or priority indices.
A random finite economy of size I is denoted by F pIq  tGpIq, qpIq, Cu. F pIq is con-
structed by independently drawing I students, indexed by i P t1,    , Iu, from the distri-
bution G and adjusting the numbers of seats to integers. Specifically, GpIq is the random
empirical distribution of types for a sample of I students;10 qpIq  rq Is{I is the supply of
seats per student, where rxs is the vector of integers nearest to x (with a rounding down
in case of a tie). We use Fˆ pIq  tGˆpIq, qpIq, Cu to denote a realization of F pIq.
In the following, we start with F pIq to specify the matching process and to analyze
student behavior, because empirical studies deal with finite economies; the extension to
the continuum economy E is deferred to Section 1.4.
In a realization of the random economy, Fˆ pIq, schools first announce their capacities,
and every student then submits a rank-order list (ROL) of 1 ¤ Ki ¤ S schools, denoted
by Li 
 
l1i , . . . , l
k
i , . . . , l
Ki
i

, where lki P S is i’s kth choice. Li also represents the set
of schools being ranked in Li. We define ¡Li such that s ¡Li s
1 if and only if school
s is ranked above school s1 in Li. The set of all possible ROLs is L, which includes all
ROLs ranking at least one school. Student i’s true ordinal preference induced by her
vNM utilities ui is denoted by rpuiq 
 
r1i , . . . , r
S
i
 P L.
When submitting an ROL, a student incurs a cost C p|L|q, which depends on the
number of schools being ranked in L, |L|. Furthermore, C p|L|q P r0, 8s for all L and is
weakly increasing in |L|. To simplify students’ participation decisions, we set C p1q  0.
Such a cost function flexibly captures many common applications of school choice
mechanisms. If C p|L|q  0 for all L, we are in the traditional setting without costs (e.g.,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003); if C p|L|q  8 for |L| greater than a constant K, it
9Assuming acceptability of all schools justifies the normalization of u P r0, 1sS . Although we could
extend the preference domain to allow for negative values, this would create the possibility that students
avoid being assigned to schools with negative vNM utilities when maximizing expected utility.
10For a realized economy with realized student types pθ1,    , θIq, the realized empirical distribution
GˆpIq is defined as GˆpIqpθq  1I
°I
i1 1pθi ¤ θq, @θ P R2S , where 1pq is an indicator function.
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corresponds to the constrained school choice where students cannot rank more than K
schools (e.g., Haeringer and Klijn, 2009); when C p|L|q  maxt0, p|L|  Kqcu, students
pay a constant marginal cost c for each choice beyond the first K choices, as in Hungarian
college admissions (Biro´, 2011); lastly, the monotonic cost function may simply reflect
that it is cognitively burdensome to rank too many schools.
The student-school match is then solved by a mechanism that takes into account
students’ ROLs and schools’ rankings over students. Our main analysis focuses on
the student-proposing Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA), leaving the discussion
of other variants to Section 5.2. As a computerized algorithm, DA works as follows:
Round 1. Every student applies to her first choice. Each school rejects the lowest-
ranked students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the other students.
Generally, in:
Round k. Every student who is rejected in Round pk  1q applies to the next choice
on her list. Each school, pooling together new applicants and those it holds from
Round pk  1q, rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity. Those who
are not rejected are temporarily held by the schools.
The process terminates after any Round k when no rejections are issued. Each school
is then matched with the students it is currently holding.
1.1 Information Structure and Decision-Making
In a realization of the finite economy, Fˆ pIq, given its construction, every student’s prefer-
ences and priority indices are private information, and are i.i.d. draws from G, which is
common knowledge (but GˆpIq, the realization of GpIq, remains unknown).
We start by taking student i’s point of view. Conditional on others’ submitted ROLs
and priority indices (Li, ei), as well as student i’s (Li, ei), her admission outcome is
deterministic, given the algorithm. Specifically, i’s admission outcome at school s is:
as pLi, ei;Li, eiq

$&% 1
 
i is rejected by l1i , . . . , l
k
i and accepted by l
k 1
i  s | Li, ei;Li, ei

0
if s P Li
if s R Li
where 1p | Li, ei;Li, eiq is an indicator function. Moreover, due to the centralized
mechanism, a student can receive at most one offer, so
°S
s1 as pLi, ei;Li, eiq  0 or 1.
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Of course, Li and ei are unknown to i at the time of submitting her ROL, so i takes
into account the uncertainty when choosing an action. A pure strategy is σ : Θ Ñ L.
Given σ, the (ex ante) admission probabilities are
³
as pσpθiq, ei;σipθiq, eiq dGpθiq for
all i and s, where σipθiq  tσpθjquji. We consider a (type-)symmetric equilibrium σ
in pure strategies such that σ solves the following maximization problem for every θi:
11
σpθiq P arg max
σpθiqPL
#¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as
 
σpθiq, ei;σipθiq, ei

dGpθiq  C p|σpθiq|q
+
. (1)
The existence of pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be established by applying
Theorem 4 (Purification Theorem) in Milgrom and Weber (1985), although there can be
multiple equilibria. For ease of exposition, the following analysis focuses on pure-strategy
equilibrium. We note that while economy F pIq is random, a strategy σ is “deterministic”
in the sense that it only depends on pG, I, Cq but not on the realization of F pIq.
We define a realized matching µˆ as a mapping from Θ to SYtHu such that: (i) µˆ pθiq  s
if student i is matched with s; (ii) µˆ pθiq  H if student i is unmatched; and (iii) µˆ1psq
is the set of students matched with s, while |µˆ1psq| is the number of students matched
with s and does not exceed s’s capacity.
Fˆ pIq and σ together lead to an ROL profile as inputs into the DA mechanism and
result in a matching, µpFˆ pIq,σq, which is uniquely determined by the mechanism. Note
that µpF pIq,σq is a random matching because F pIq is a random economy.
Moreover, the (random) cutoff of school s in random matching µpF pIq,σq is defined as:
Ps

µpF pIq,σq
	

$&% min
!
ei,s | µpF pIq,σq pθiq  s
)
0
if |µ1pF pIq,σq psq |  q
pIq
s
if |µ1pF pIq,σq psq |   q
pIq
s
That is, Ps

µpF pIq,σq
	
is zero if s does not meet its capacity; otherwise, it is the lowest pri-
ority index among all accepted students. The vector of cutoffs is denoted by P

µpF pIq,σq
	
,
and its realization in Fˆ pIq is P

µpFˆ pIq,σq
	
.
11It is innocuous to focus on symmetric equilibrium, because it does not restrict the strategy of any
student given that they all have different priority indices (almost surely).
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1.2 Truth-Telling Behavior in Equilibrium
To assess the plausibility of the truth-telling assumption in empirical studies, we begin
by investigating students’ truth-telling behavior in equilibrium. A clarification of the
concepts is in order. Student i is weakly truth-telling (WTT, hereafter) if σpθiq 
pr1i , r2i , . . . , rKii q for Ki ¤ S. That is, i ranks her Ki most-preferred schools by her true
preference order but may not rank all schools. If a WTT strategy always truthfully ranks
all S schools and thus σpθiq  rpuiq, i is strictly truth-telling (STT, hereafter).12
We emphasize the difference between WTT and STT because strategy-proofness con-
cerns the latter. However, WTT is often considered in empirical studies because in
practice, students rarely rank all available schools, as we shall revisit in Section 2.2.
It is known that DA is strategy-proof when there is no application cost (Dubins and
Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). That is, when C p|L|q  0 for all L P L, STT is a weakly-
dominant strategy for all students. However, strategy-proofness, or weak dominance of
STT, leaves open the possibility of multiple equilibria. Even when all others play STT,
there may exist multiple best responses for a given student.13 It is therefore useful to
clarify the conditions under which STT is the unique equilibrium. The following example
highlights two sources of equilibrium multiplicity in a complete-information environment.
Example 1 (Multiple Equilibria under DA without Application Cost). Consider
a finite economy that has two students (i1, i2), three one-seat schools (s1, s2, s3), but no
application cost. As common knowledge, all schools rank i1 above i2; student i1’s prefer-
ence order is ps1, s2, s3q, but i2’s is ps2, s1, s3q. There are many equilibria in addition to
STT, stemming from two sources: “irrelevance at the bottom” and “skipping the
impossible.” Both arise when some admission probabilities are zero.
For i1, the bottom part of her submitted ROL is irrelevant as long as s1 is top-ranked.
In fact, any ROL (s1, s
1, s2), for s1, s2 P ts2, s3u Y tHu, is weakly dominant for i1, as she
is always accepted by s1. For student i2, “skipping the impossible” comes into play. She
can omit s1 from her submitted ROL without affecting her outcome, because s1 is always
taken by i1 in any equilibrium. Making things worse, how she ranks s1 is payoff-irrelevant.
12Related to the distinction between STT and WTT, the literature on lab experiments on school choice
sometimes also defines truth-telling as being different from STT. For example, Chen and So¨nmez (2006)
call a student truth-telling under the DA mechanism if she ranks her most-preferred schools up to her
district school, at which she has guaranteed admission.
13Unfortunately, it is impossible to make STT a strictly-dominant strategy, because it would require
STT to be strictly better than all other strategies against all possible action profiles of other students.
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One may conjecture that STT might survive as the unique equilibrium when infor-
mation is incomplete. Indeed, specifying the incompleteness of information, the following
proposition provides sufficient conditions and a necessary condition.
Proposition 1. (i) Sufficiency: STT is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under
DA if (i) there is no application cost: C p|L|q  0, @L P L; and (ii) the joint distribution
of preferences and priorities G has full support.
(ii) Necessity: For any non-zero application cost, there always exist student types for
whom STT is not an equilibrium strategy.
All proofs can be found in Appendix A. The no-cost condition is violated if students
cannot rank as many schools as they wish, or if they suffer a cognitive burden when
ranking too many schools. It should also be emphasized that the cost need not be large
to make students deviate from STT, because the marginal benefit of ranking an additional
school can be close to zero. When a student considers her admission probability at her
kth choice, she may face a close-to-one probability of being accepted by at least one of her
earlier choices. This is in the same spirit as the “irrelevance at the bottom” in Example 1.
When the marginal application cost exceeds marginal benefits, STT is no longer a best
response, which implies the necessity of the zero-cost condition.
The full-support condition, also considered in Chen and Pereyra (2017), makes all
admission probabilities non-zero by introducing uncertainties, and therefore any deviation
from STT is costly. This is more plausible when the priority index is determined by an ex
post lottery and when the information on others’ preferences over schools is less precise.
Remark 1. Proposition 1 specifies when students have incentives to rank all schools
truthfully, but this result does not extend to WTT. Although it is sometimes used for
identification and estimation, the WTT assumption is not supported as an equilibrium.14
We may take one step back and focus on whether students have incentives to order the
ranked schools truthfully. We call Li, |Li| ¤ S, a partial preference order of schools
if Li respects the true preference order among those ranked in Li. That is, Li ranks s
above s1, only if ui,s ¡ ui,s1 ; when s is not ranked in Li, there is no information on how s
is ranked relative to any other school according to i’s true preferences.
14The equilibrium condition, Equation (1), implies that a student may “skip the impossible” by omit-
ting her most-preferred school if the admission probability is close to zero, thus violating WTT.
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Proposition 2. Under DA with application cost, if students do not play weakly dominated
strategies, a student’s submitted ROL is a partial order of her true preferences.
Proposition 2 can be considered as a corollary of Proposition 4.2 in Haeringer and
Klijn (2009), and thus we omit its proof. The key is that a non-partial-preference-order
ROL is weakly dominated by the ROL that ranks the same schools according to their
true preference order. This result is useful for empirical analysis, as it specifies students’
revealed preferences. Section 2.5 formulates how to use this information in estimation.
1.3 Matching Outcome: Stability
The above results speak to the plausibility of the truth-telling assumptions, WTT and
STT, in empirical studies. In particular, WTT is not theoretically supported as a weakly-
dominant strategy even in DA with no application cost; whenever there is any form of
application cost, STT is no longer a dominant strategy.
Taking a different perspective, we note that all equilibria lead to the same matching
in Example 1. This motivates us to investigate the properties of equilibrium outcomes
of DA. Intuitively, the degree of multiplicity in equilibrium outcomes must be smaller
than that in equilibrium strategies. In the two-sided matching literature, stability is the
leading concept for equilibrium outcome and the main identifying assumption (Chiappori
and Salanie´, 2016). We investigate whether stability can also be satisfied in all equilibrium
outcomes of school choice and college admissions.
Unfortunately, we shall demonstrate that having stability satisfied in all equilibrium
outcomes requires similar conditions to those for STT being the unique equilibrium. In
fact, whenever there is application cost, stability is not guaranteed in equilibrium either.
This is because Bayesian Nash equilibrium implies ex ante optimality of student strategy,
while stability requires ex post optimality.
As we study a matching’s ex post properties, let us consider µˆ, a realization of the
random matching. pi, sq form a blocking pair if (i) i prefers s over her matched school
µˆpθiq while s has an empty seat (|µˆ1psq|   I  qpIqs ), or if (ii) i prefers s over µˆpθiq while
s has no empty seats (|µˆ1psq|  I  qpIqs ) but i’s priority index is higher than its cutoff,
ei,s ¡ mintj:µˆpθjqsutej,su. µˆ is stable if there is no blocking pair. Stability is also known
as elimination of justified envy in school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
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Given a realized matching µˆ, school s is ex post feasible for i if i’s priority index at
s is above s’s cutoff, ei,s ¥ Pspµˆq. Let Spei, P pµˆqq be the set of feasible schools for i.
With these definitions, combining Lemmata 1 and 2 in Balinski and So¨nmez (1999),
we reach an important result: a realized matching µˆ is stable if and only if every student
is matched with her favorite feasible school (i.e., µˆpθiq  arg maxsPSpei,P pµˆqq ui,s, @i). As
the cutoffs of a matching are observed ex post by the researcher, we can define every
student’s set of feasible schools; stability therefore implies a discrete choice model with
observable, personalized choice sets. We further formalize this in Section 2.3.
We are interested in stability being satisfied in an outcome of dominant-strategy
equilibrium, which would free us from specifying the information structure and from
imposing additional equilibrium conditions. The following lemma provides necessary and
sufficient conditions, which are similar to those for STT to be the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Under DA, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in dominant strategy always leads
to a stable matching if and only if C p|L|q  0 for all L. It is the unique equilibrium
outcome if additionally G has full support.
The “if and only if” statement of the lemma is implied by strategy-proofness of DA
without application cost, while the uniqueness statement is a result of Proposition 1.
DA is known to produce a stable matching when students are STT (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962), but not when students are only WTT. The following results, clarifying the
relationship between WTT and stability, have implications for our empirical approaches.
Proposition 3. Suppose that every student is WTT under DA, which may not be an
equilibrium. Given a realized matching:
(i) whenever a student is assigned, she is matched with her favorite feasible school;
(ii) if everyone who has at least one feasible school is assigned, the matching is stable.
The above results describe the nesting structure of the two assumptions, WTT and
stability, although they do not speak to the plausibility of either of them being an equi-
librium strategy/outcome. Specifically, WTT is more restrictive, as it implies the no-
blocking property among assigned students. We use these results to formulate statistical
tests for the choice between WTT and stability in Section 2.4.
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1.4 Asymptotic Stability in Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
So far, we have shown that neither truth-telling (STT and WTT) nor stability can emerge
in equilibrium without some potentially restrictive assumptions. Following the literature
on large markets, we study whether stability can be asymptotically satisfied.
We now revisit the continuum economy, E, and additionally introduce a sequence of
random finite economies tF pIquIPN that are constructed from E as before.
The definitions of matching, DA, and stability can be naturally extended to continuum
economies as in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016), which are
discussed in Appendix A.2.1. These definitions are similar to their counterparts in finite
economies. For example, a matching in E when everyone adopts σ is µpE,σq : Θ Ñ SYtHu,
which satisfies (i) µpE,σqpθiq  s when type θi is matched with s and (ii) Gpµ1pE,σqpsqq ¤ qs.
It is known that, generically, there exists a unique stable matching in the continuum
economy (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016);15 we impose the conditions for the uniqueness and
denote this stable matching in E as µ8 and the corresponding cutoffs as P8. To continue
our exploration, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Every Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the continuum economy E results
in the unique stable matching, µ8.
A sufficient condition for Assumption 1 is Cp2q ¡ 0 (i.e., it is costly to apply to
more than one school), and when Cp2q  0, a sufficient and necessary condition is Ergin
acyclicity (Proposition A3 in Appendix A.2.5). An economy is acyclical if no student can
block a potential settlement between any other two students without affecting her own
match (Ergin, 2002). Appendix A.2.5 gives its formal definition in continuum economies.
This condition is satisfied when all schools rank every student by a single priority index.
Because we are interested in equilibrium outcomes, we augment the sequence of
economies with equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, where σpIq is a pure-strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in F pIq and satisfies the following assumption.
15A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of stable outcome in E is that G has full support. Even
when G does not have full support, the uniqueness can be achieved when
°S
s1 qs   1. Let σ
STT
be the STT strategy. We define the demand for each school in pE, σSTT q as a function of cutoffs,
DspP | E, σ
STT q 
³
1pui,s  maxs1PSpei,P q ui,s1qdGpθiq. Let DpP | E, σ
STT q  rDspP | E, σqssPS .
E admits a unique stable matching if the image under DpP | E, σSTT q of the closure of the set 
P P p0, 1qS : DpP | E, σSTT q is not continuously differentiable at P
(
has Lebesgue measure zero.
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Assumption 2. There exists σ8 such that limIÑ8G
  
θi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiq
(  1.
A sufficient condition for Assumption 2 is Cp2q ¡ 0 (Lemma A5 in Appendix A.2.4).16
Although F pIq is a random economy, σpIq is fixed given the size of the economy. In other
words, σpIq remains as an equilibrium strategy in any realization of F pIq. Assumption 2
regulates how the equilibria evolve with economy size, which is necessary as there are
multiple equilibria. By this assumption, in the sequence tσpIquIPN, fewer and fewer student
types need to adjust their optimal actions when the economy enlarges. Moreover, given
Assumption 1, the limit strategy σ8 leads to µ8 in E (Proposition A1).
1.4.1 Asymptotic Stability: Definition and Results
Let the random matching µpF pIq,σpIqq be µpIq, and the associated random cutoffs P
 
µpIq

be P pIq. The following definition formalizes the concept of asymptotic stability.17
Definition 1. A sequence of random matchings, tµpIquIPN, associated with the sequence
of random economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, is asymptotically stable
if the fraction of students who are matched with their favorite feasible school in a random
finite economy (F pIq) converges to one, almost surely, or, equivalently,
lim
IÑ8
GpIq

tθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,su

 1, almost surely.
We are now ready to introduce our main result.
Proposition 4. In the sequence of random economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN,
if Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then
(i) the random cutoffs converge to those of the stable matching in the continuum
economy: limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8, almost surely;
(ii) the sequence of random matchings, tµpIquIPN, is asymptotically stable.
16Allowing Cp2q  0, Appendix A.2.4 investigates the properties of equilibrium strategies. The results,
Lemmata A2–A4, imply strong restrictions on the sequence of Bayesian Nash equilibria in the direction
of satisfying Assumption 2. Specifically, it is shown that a strategy that does not lead to µ8 in the
continuum economy cannot survive as an equilibrium when I Ñ 8. This immediately implies that in
sufficiently large economies, every student includes in her ROL the school prescribed by µ8. Moreover,
students do not pay a cost to rank more schools in large economies.
17We define the probability space, pΩ,F ,Pq. Specifically, Ω ±IPNΘI , and an element in Ω is denoted
by ω  pω1, ω2,    q, where ωI is a possible realization of student types in the random economy F
pIq. F
is a Borel σ-algebra of Ω, and P is a probability measure from F to r0, 1s.
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Part (ii) implies that the fraction of students who are matched with their favorite
feasible school, or not in any blocking pair, converges to one almost surely, as the economy
grows. This provides justifications for the stability assumption in large markets.18
1.4.2 Probability of Being in a Blocking Pair for a Given Student
To assess if a matching is likely to be stable, we investigate how the probability that
a given student is in a blocking pair changes with economy attributes. The following
proposition shows how economy size, application cost, and other factors play a role.
Proposition 5. Suppose student i exists in all economies in the sequence tF pIquIPN which
is associated with a sequence of Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies tσpIquIPN.
(i) Let σpIqpθiq  LpIq; then LpIq is a partial order of i’s ordinal preferences. If ex post
i forms a blocking pair with s, s must not be included in LpIq, s R LpIq.
The probability that i is in a blocking pair with any school in the random matching
µpIq, denoted by B
pIq
i  PrpDs P S, ui,s ¡ ui,µpIqpθiq, and ei,s ¥ P pIqs q, satisfies:
(ii) B
pIq
i is bounded above: B
pIq
i ¤ |SzLpIq|Cp|L
pIq| 1qCp|LpIq|q
max
sPSzLpIq ui,s
;
(iii) if tσpIquIPN satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, BpIqi converges to zero almost surely.
Because in equilibrium student i reports a partial order of her true preferences, she
can only form a blocking pair with a school that she did not rank (part i). Therefore, the
probability that i is in a blocking pair decreases whenever it is less costly to rank more
schools (part ii). Together, Proposition 5 shows that stability is more plausible when the
cost of ranking more schools is lower and/or the economy is large. Moreover, in the case
of constrained/truncated DA where there is a limit on the length of ROLs, the higher
the number of schools that can be ranked, the more likely stability is to be satisfied.
2 Empirical Approaches
Building on the theoretical results, we formalize the estimation of student preferences
under different sets of assumptions and propose a series of tests to guide the selection of
the appropriate approach. To be more concrete, we consider a logit-type random utility
model, although our approaches can be extended to other specifications.
18This result, however, does not mean that the probability of a matching being stable converges to
one as the market grows. As long as there is at least one blocking pair, a matching is not stable.
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This section focuses on a random finite economy F pIq in which I students compete for
admissions to S schools. Each school has a positive capacity, and students are assigned
through a version of the student-proposing DA. Besides submitted ROLs and admission
outcomes, the researcher observes priority indices, student characteristics, and school
attributes. Given these observables, we discuss the probability of a student submitting a
given ROL or being matched with a given school from the researcher’s perspective.
2.1 Model Setting and Revealed Preferences
As is traditional and more convenient in empirical analysis, we let the student utility
functions take any value on the real line.19 With some abuse, we still use the same
notation for utility functions. To facilitate the analysis, student i’s utility from attending
schools s is parameterized:
ui,s  Vi,s   i,s  V pZi,s, βq   i,s, (2)
where V p, q is a known function, taking as arguments Zi,s, a vector of observable student-
school characteristics, and β, a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; i,s is the
unobservable student heterogeneity.
We further define Zi  tZi,suSs1, and i  ti,suSs1. It is assumed that i K Zi and
that i,s is i.i.d. over i and s with the type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution. Such
a formulation rules out outside options, although this assumption can be relaxed.
We also assume that a student’s preferences are not affected by other students’ school
assignments (no peer effects) and that statistics associated with the realized matching,
such as cutoffs, do not enter the utility function. This is consistent with the theoretical
model in Section 1 and implies that Zi does not include variables that depend on the
ex-post observed matching.
The estimation relies on revealed student preferences in the data, and what infor-
mation is revealed crucially depends on the imposed assumption—WTT, stability, or
undominated stategies. Figure 1 shows an example. WTT takes the submitted ranking
as truthful and assumes unranked schools being the least preferable. Stability dictates
that a student is matched with her favorable feasible school. Lastly, a submitted ROL
19In the theoretical discussion, the utility functions are restricted to be in r0, 1s. One can use the
inverse of standard normal distribution, Φ1, to transform them to be on the real line. Note that the
expected utility theory cannot be applied to the transformed utility functions; indeed, we do not.
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Data
Available schools: s1, . . . , s4
Student i’s priority indices: ei,s  0.5, @s
Submitted ROL of i: ps1, s3q
Admission outcome of i: s3
Cutoffs: P  p0.8, 0.9, 0.4, 0.2q
ùñ
Revealed preferences
WTT: ui,s1 ¡ ui,s3 ¡ ui,s, for s  s2, s4
Stability: ui,s3 ¡ ui,s4
Undominated
ui,s1 ¡ ui,s3strategies:
Figure 1: Revealed Preferences under Different Assumptions—An Example
reveals the student’s partial preference order if no one plays dominated strategies. We
now detail how to use this information in the estimation.
2.2 Truth-Telling
In the literature on school choice with lotteries, some empirical approaches are based
on the truth-telling assumption (Hastings et al., 2008; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2017). As
similar mechanisms are commonly used in our strict-priority setting, we extend these
approaches to our setting and clarify the assumptions embedded within.
We start with WTT instead of STT because in practice students in school choice
and college admissions rarely rank the same number of choices (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.,
2017; He, 2015; Artemov et al., 2017). Under the assumption of truth-telling without
outside option, this can only be consistent with WTT but not STT, because STT requires
everyone to rank all schools. We discuss STT with outside options in Appendix A.4.
For notational convenience, we make it explicit that student i’s type θi is described
by pui, eiq. Let σW : RS  r0, 1sS Ñ L be a WTT pure strategy.20 More precisely, the
WTT assumption amounts to the following:
Assumption (Characterization of Weak Truth-Telling).
WTT1. Suppose σW pui, eiq  L  pl1, . . . , lKiq. L ranks i’s top Ki preferred schools
according to her true preferences: ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lKi ¡ ui,s1 for all s1 not ranked in L;
WTT2. The number of schools ranked by a student is exogenous: ui K |σW pui, eiq|, @i.
We are interested in the choice probability of L conditional on observables, where the
uncertainty from the researcher’s perspective is due to the utility shocks (i). Note that:
Pr
 
σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β
Pr  σW pui, eiq  Lq  Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K Pr  |σW pui, eiq|  K  Zi; β ,
20Because the preference space is transformed from r0, 1sS to RS , a strategy is now defined on the
transformed type space. Moreover, it will be clear that σW does not depend on priority indices, ei.
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which are calculated by integrating out the unobservables (i) in ui. Assumption WTT2
implies that Pr
 |σW pui, eiq|  K  Zi; β does not depend on preferences. Thus, in the
estimation, it suffices to focus on the following conditional probability:
Pr
 
σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K
Pr  ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,s1 @ s1 P SzL  Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K

¹
sPL

exppVi,sq°
s1£Ls
exppVi,s1q

,
where s1 £L s indicates that s
1 is not ranked before s in L, including s itself and those
excluded from L. This rank-ordered (or “exploded”) logit model can be seen as a series
of conditional logits: one for the top-ranked school (l1) being the most preferred, another
for the second-ranked school (l2) being preferred to all schools except l1, and so on.
Let |σW | be the vector of lengths of all submitted ROLs. The model can be estimated
by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with the log-likelihood function:
lnLTT
 
β
 Z, |σW |  I¸
i1
¸
sPσW pui,eiq
Vi,s 
I¸
i1
¸
sPσW pui,eiq
ln
 ¸
s1£
σW pui,eiq
s
exppVi,s1q
	
.
The estimator is denoted by βˆTT . Alternatively, the generalized method of moment
(GMM) can be employed, for which the moment conditions are derived as in Section 2.5.
WTT implies additional restrictions beyond standard discrete choice models (see details
in Section 2.4). Thus, the discrete-choice literature (e.g., Matzkin, 1993) implies that stu-
dent preferences are nonparametrically identified (also see Agarwal and Somaini, 2018).
2.3 Stability
We now assume that the matching is stable, which is different from, but in large samples
justified by, asymptotic stability. The following analysis abstracts away from the match-
ing mechanism and ignores how stability is obtained. We formulate a stable matching
as the outcome of a discrete choice model and clarify the conditions that are needed for
identification and estimation.
Consider the matching µ and the associated cutoffs P pµq, which are random variables
determined by the unobserved utility shocks (). µ is the outcome of a discrete choice
model with personalized choice set, Spei, P pµqq (i.e., the set of i’s feasible schools). The
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probability that i is matched with s, or chooses s in Spei, P pµqq, is:
Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi, ei,Spei, P pµqq; β

.
To proceed, we impose the following assumptions:
Assumption (Exogeneity of Priority Index and Feasible Set).
EXO1. For all i, eiKi|Zi: Conditional on observables Zi, student preferences and prior-
ity indices are independent.
EXO2. For all i and s, 1pei,s   PspµqqKi|Zi, or Spei, P pµqqKi|Zi: Conditional on ob-
servables Zi, a student’s preferences and her set of feasible schools are independent.
Assumption EXO1 implies that, when priority indices (ei) are determined by test
scores, no student intentionally under-performs or over-performs in exams.
Assumption EXO2 deserves some discussion. Most importantly, it does not require
that cutoffs P pµq are conditionally independent of preferences shocks i. Instead, it
only assumes that the personalized choice set, Spei, P pµqq, is exogenously given, which is
necessary for identification in a discrete choice model with personalized choice sets. For
instance, if instead Spei, P pµqq is endogenous and only includes school s when s is i’s most
preferred school, we lose the identification of i’s preferences, because there is no variation
in i’s choice whenever s is in Spei, P pµqq. Appendix A.5 details such an example, along
with a discussion and an example in which the assumption is satisfied.
One may argue that, in a finite market, a student can affect some cutoffs by applying
to a school or not, and thus can change the feasibility of some schools. Another concern
is that given student preferences, there can be multiple stable matchings. If a single
student can select among the stable matchings, Assumption EXO2 is also violated.
These concerns diminish as the economy grows large, because the potential influence
on cutoffs by any student decreases and there tends to be a unique stable matching.
For instance, Part (i) of Proposition 4 implies that a single student’s impact on cutoffs
diminishes to zero, almost surely. Moreover, even in small markets, Assumption EXO2
can be satisfied, because the assumption does not require P pµqKi|Zi. An example is
when every school ranks students in the same way, or ei,s  ei for all s and i.21
21In this case, DA is equivalent to serial dictatorship in which students choose the remaining schools
one by one in the order determined by their priority indices. There is a unique stable matching for
each realization of student types. Moreover, the set of feasible schools for student i is determined
21
Given the parametric assumptions on utility functions, the corresponding (condi-
tional) log-likelihood function is:
lnLST pβ | Z, e,Spei, P pµqqq 
I¸
i1
S¸
s1
Vi,s  1pµpui, eiq  sq 
I¸
i1
ln
 ¸
s1PSpei,P pµqq
exppVi,s1q
	
. (3)
This estimator is denoted by βˆST . Similarly, GMM can be applied, as in Section 2.5.
Identification. The above discussion transforms the matching game into a discrete
choice model.22 Therefore, the nonparametric identification arguments for discrete choice
models still apply (Matzkin, 1993). An important feature in the stability-based estimation
is that students face personalized choice sets. As long as the choice sets are determined
exogenously (Assumption EXO2), the identification goes through.
Another concern is that a student’s priority index may enter her utility functions di-
rectly, when, for example, priority indices are determined by test score or student ability.
In this case, the stability assumption does not reveal information about low-scoring stu-
dents’ preferences over popular schools, because such schools are often infeasible to them.
This may lead to a failure of identifying how test scores determine student preferences.
This problem is mitigated if we have another measure of student ability, as in our
empirical exercise. We assume that conditional on student ability, priority indices do
not determine preferences and only affect school feasibility. If, additionally, priority
indices have full support (i.e., can take any possible value) at each given level of student
ability, we can observe some low-ability students having all schools feasible. This restores
nonparametric identification in discrete choice models as in Matzkin (1993).
Relative to WTT, the stability assumption uses unambiguously less information from
the data (see Figure 1 for an example). WTT utilizes all information implied by the
submitted ROLs, while stability only imposes restrictions on admission outcome. One
by the students with higher priority indices. Because preferences are independent across students by
assumption, we have Spei, P pµqqKi|Zi, or 1pei,s   PspµqqKi|Zi for all s.
It should be noted that P pµqMi|Zi even in this case. For example, when i chooses s among the feasible
schools, the cutoff of s will possibly increase; similarly, i may decrease s’s cutoff by choosing a different
school. However, we always have 1pei,s   PspµqqKi|Zi, because s will remain feasible to i either way.
22A simplification is that we ignore the restrictions implied by the cutoffs P pµq, which may lead to
efficiency loss in estimation. That is, even when the sets of feasible schools are exogenous to every
single student’s preferences, P pµq is endogenously determined by the model’s parameters. However,
the additional information in these restrictions may be negligible, since we use the information on the
whole matching already. An earlier version of the paper relaxes this assumption and uses the restrictions
implied by the cutoffs. Our estimation results from simulated data and school choice data from Paris
show that using the cutoff restrictions makes a negligible difference in the estimation results.
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may expect that the stability-based approach leads to a loss of information; in particular,
we may lose some precision in estimating the substitution patterns when we allow for more
flexible random utility models (Berry et al., 2004; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2017). Indeed,
as we shall see in our Monte Carlo simulations and the analysis of the school choice data
from Paris, there is a clear bias-variance tradeoff: stability tolerates non-truth-telling
behavior at the cost of yielding less precise estimates.
Estimation with Asymptotic Stability. When taking the above results to real-life
data, one may be concerned that the matching may not be exactly stable. Indeed, our
theoretical results only prove asymptotic stability. This raises the question of whether the
estimator is still consistent. In Appendix A.3, we show that the MLE with asymptotic
stability is consistent (Proposition A4). In a finite economy, the stability-based estimation
is incorrectly specified, because some students may not be assigned to their favorite
feasible school and their reveal preferences are mis-classified when stability is imposed.
However, the fraction of students who are not assigned to their favorite feasible school
converges to zero at an exponential rate (part iii of Proposition A2), implying that the
mis-classification in revealed preferences vanishes with economy size. By verifying the
conditions in Theorem 2.1 of Newey and McFadden (1994), we show that the stability-
based estimator is consistent even when the matching is only asymptotically stable.
2.4 Testing Truth-Telling against Stability
Having two distinct estimators, βˆTT and βˆST , makes it possible to test the truth-telling
assumption against stability. Maintaining the assumption of identification given stability,
we shall see shortly that WTT provides over-identifying restrictions.
Before we present the tests, a few caveats are in order. First, one should check that
the conditions for identification (for example, those in Matzkin, 1993) are satisfied before
conducting the tests. Second, because the tests are essentially about joint restrictions on
the parametric assumptions and the behavioral assumptions, one should be aware of the
consequence of model misspecification. Rejecting truth-telling in favor of stability may
not provide definitive proof against truth-telling, since the proposed tests are conditional
on the model’s parametric assumptions. In light of these limitations, it is often useful
to provide additional empirical results, such as reduced-form results on student behavior
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(see, e.g., Section 4.2) and goodness of fit of the estimates (see, e.g., Section 4.4).
Over-identifying Restrictions. As summarized in Proposition 3, if every student is
WTT and is assigned to a school, the matching is stable. Stability, however, does not
imply that students are WTT and is therefore a less restrictive assumption.
To see the additional restrictions from WTT, let us consider student i who submits a
K-choice list L and is matched with school s. Therefore, s must be ranked in L. WTT
implies the following conditions on the choice probability:
Pr

σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K	
Pr

ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,s1 , @s1 P SzL
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K; s  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s

 Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi; β;Spei, P pµqq

(4)
This equality uses the fact that the event,
 
ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lKi ¡ ui,s1 , @s1 P SzL

, implies 
s  arg maxsPSpei,P pµqq ui,s

but not the reverse.23 This is because i’s feasible schools are
either ranked below s in L or are omitted from L; in either case, WTT requires that s
is preferred to any other feasible school. Therefore, the first conditional probability on
the right-hand side of the equality cannot always be one. As the restrictions implied
by stability are just Pr
 
s  µpui, eiq  arg maxsPSpei,P pµqq ui,s | Zi; β;Spei, P pµqq

, the ad-
ditional restrictions from WTT are summarized in the first term. When the model is
identified under stability, Equation (4) summarizes the over-identifying restrictions.
Hausman Test. Our estimator βˆTT uses all the restrictions implied by WTT. There-
fore, under the null hypothesis that students are WTT, both estimators βˆTT and βˆST
are consistent but only βˆTT is asymptotically efficient. Under the alternative that the
matching is stable but not all students are WTT, only βˆST is consistent.
In this setting, the general specification test developed by Hausman (1978) can be
23We also make use of the exogeneity of the set of feasible schools (Assumption EXO2) and the
exogeneity of the length of submitted ROL (Assumption WTT2). Therefore,
Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi;β;Spei, P pµqq

 Pr

s  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi;β; |σW pui, eiq|  K

.
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applied by computing the following test statistic:
TH  pβˆST  βˆTT q1pVˆST  VˆTT q1pβˆST  βˆTT q,
where pVˆST  VˆTT q1 is the inverse of the difference between the asymptotic covariance
matrices of βˆST and βˆTT .
24 Under the null hypothesis, TH  χ2pdβq, where dβ is the
dimension of β. If the model is correctly specified and the matching is stable, the rejection
of the null hypothesis implies that WTT is violated in the data.
Testing Over-identifying Restrictions. The above Hausman test requires that we
have a consistent and efficient estimator, βˆTT . When relying on MLE or GMM, this
calls for strong parametric assumptions. An alternative is to construct a test for over-
identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is made feasible because of the nesting
structure of WTT and stability due to Proposition 3. Instead of requiring βˆTT to be
asymptotically efficient, the test for over-identifying restrictions only requires that βˆTT
utilizes more restrictions than βˆST . With Equation (4), we can separate out the additional
restrictions and test whether they are satisfied based on Hansen (1982).
No-blocking among Assigned Students. The above estimation and tests can be
applied even if stability is violated. Part (i) of Proposition 3 states that whenever a WTT
student is assigned, she is matched with her favorite feasible school and thus is not in any
blocking pair. However, this no-blocking condition can be violated among unassigned
students, implying the violation of stability. We can thus re-formulate the above tests
as WTT against “no-blocking among assigned students.” The estimation based on “no-
blocking among assigned students” will exclude unassigned students; it does not create
selection bias under the null hypothesis, because the length of every submitted ROL,
which determines the probability of being unassigned, is exogenous under WTT.
2.5 Undominated Strategies and Stability
The stability-based approach described above is only valid when the matching is stable.
However, as we have shown theoretically, stability can fail. Without stability, one may
24Since exact stability is assumed, the calculation of VˆST does not take into account the sampling
variance of cutoffs in a finite economy.
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consider the undominated-strategies assumption, under which observed ROLs are stu-
dents’ true partial preference orders. That is, a submitted ROL, Li, respects i’s true
preference order among the schools ranked in Li (see, for an example, Figure 1).
These partial orders provide information that can be used to identify student prefer-
ences, but only partially, because the econometric structure is now incomplete (Tamer,
2003). In other words, for a student with type pui, eiq, the assumption of undominated
strategies does not predict a unique ROL for the student. As we shall see, undominated
strategies lead to a set of inequality restrictions that can be satisfied by a set of β’s,
instead of a unique vector of β. Therefore, we lose point identification.
Moment Inequalities. Students’ submitted ROLs can be used to form conditional
moment inequalities. Without loss of generality, consider two schools s1 and s2. Since
not everyone ranks both schools, the probability of i, who adopts the strategy σpui, eiq,
ranking s1 before s2, i.e., s1 ¡σpui,eiq s2, is:
Pr
 
s1 ¡σpui,eiq s2 | Zi; β
 Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 and s1, s2 P σpui, eiq | Zi; βq
¤Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq (5)
The first equality is due to undominated strategies, and the inequality defines a lower
bound for the conditional probability of ui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 . Similarly, an upper bound is:
Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq ¤ 1 Pr
 
s2 ¡σpui,eiq s1 | Zi; β

. (6)
Inequalities (5) and (6) yield the following conditional moment inequalities:
Prpui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq  E

1ps1 ¡σpui,eiq s2q | Zi; β
 ¥ 0;
1 E 1ps2 ¡σpui,eiq s1q | Zi; β Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq ¥ 0.
Similar inequalities can be computed for any school pair and can be generalized to any
n schools in S, for 2 ¤ n ¤ S. In the simulations and empirical analysis, we focus on
inequalities for pairs. The bounds become uninformative if n ¥ 3, because not many
schools are simultaneously ranked by the majority of students. We interact Zi with the
conditional inequalities and obtainM1 unconditional moment inequalities, pm1, . . . ,mM1q.
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Estimation with Moment Inequalities. For estimation with moment inequalities,
one can follow the approach of Andrews and Shi (2013), which is valid for both point
and partial identifications. The objective function is a test statistic, TMIpβq, of the
Cramer-von Mises type with the modified method of moments (or sum function). With
the unconditional moment inequalities, it is constructed as follows:
TMIpβq 
M1¸
j1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2

(7)
where m¯jpβq and σˆjpβq are the sample mean and standard deviation of the jth moment,
mjpβq, respectively; and r s is such that ras  mint0, au. One can then follow Bugni
et al. (2017) to construct marginal confidence intervals. For a given coordinate βk of β,
the authors test the hypothesis H0 : βk  β0, for a given β0 P R. The confidence interval
for βk’s true value is the convex hull of all β0’s at which H0 is not rejected.
While the assumption of undominated strategies seems plausible, it should be noted
that the above approach often leads to uninformative confidence intervals of parameters of
interest, constrained by the available econometric techniques. However, one can integrate
the inequalities with the restrictions implied by stability, when stability is also plausible.
2.5.1 Integrating Stability with Undominated Strategies
An important advantage of the stability-based approach is that it only requires data on
the admission outcomes. However, submitted ROLs are often observed and can be used
to improve estimation efficiency. Under the assumption that stability provides point
identification of student preferences, these ROLs provide over-identifying information
that can be used together with stability in estimation.
The potential benefits can be illustrated in a simple example. Consider a con-
strained/truncated DA where students are only allowed to rank up to three schools out
of four. With personalized sets of feasible schools under the stability assumption, the
preferences over two schools, say s1 and s2, are estimated mainly from the sub-sample of
students who are assigned to either of these schools while having priority indices above
the cutoffs of both. Yet it is possible that all students include s1 and s2 in their ROLs,
even if these schools are not ex post feasible for some students. In such a situation, all
students could be used to estimate the preference order of s1 and s2, rather than just a
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sub-sample. As shown below, this argument can be extended to the case where two or
more schools are observed being ranked by a subset of students.
Moment Equalities. To integrate the above over-identifying information in ROLs
with that from stability, we reformulate the likelihood function described in Equation (3)
into moment equalities. The choice probability of the matched school can be rewritten
as a moment condition by equating theoretical and empirical probabilities:
I¸
i1
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P q
pui,s1q | Zi, P pµq; β
	
 E
 I¸
i1
1pµpui, eiq  sq
	
 0, @s P S,
where 1pµpui, eiq  sq is an indicator function taking the value of one if and only if
µpui, eiq  s. We again interact the variables in Z with the above conditions, leading to
M2 moment equalities, pmM1 1, . . . ,mM1 M2q.
Estimation with Moment (In)equalities. To obtain consistent point estimates with
both equality and inequality moments (henceforth, moment (in)equalities), we augment
the test statistic in Equation (7) to incorporate the M2 unconditional moment equalities:
TMEIpβq 
M1¸
j1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2

 
M1 M2¸
jM1 1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2
. (8)
We denote the point estimate βˆMEI , which minimizes TMEIpβq, and we can take the same
approach as in Bugni et al. (2017) to construct marginal confidence intervals for β.
2.6 Testing Stability against Undominated Strategies
Given the identification of student preferences under stability, the moment inequalities
add over-identifying information. This constitutes a test of stability, provided that stu-
dents do not play dominated strategies. More precisely, if both assumptions are satisfied,
the moment (in)equalities in Section 2.5.1 should yield a point estimate that fits the
data relatively well; otherwise, there should not exist a point β that satisfies all moment
(in)equalities. Formally, we follow the specification test in Bugni et al. (2015).
It should be noted that, for the above test, we maintain the undominated-strategies
assumption, which may raise concerns, because students could make mistakes as docu-
mented in several real-life contexts; moreover, untrue partial preference ordering is not
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dominated under the school-proposing DA. We revisit these issues in Section 5.2.
The discussion in Section 2.5 provides another test of the undominated-strategies
assumption, which also relies on the non-emptyness of the identified set under the null
hypothesis (Bugni et al., 2015). That is, if there is no value of β satisfying the moment
inequalities, the undominated-strategies assumption is not satisfied. Unfortunately, the
available methods of moment (in)equalities tend to result in conservative confidence sets
of parameters, which implies that this test may lack power.
3 Results from Monte Carlo Simulations
To illustrate the proposed estimation approaches and tests, we carry out Monte Carlo
simulations, the details of which are consigned to Appendix C.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the school choice problem is simulated in two set-
tings where I students compete for admission to 6 schools with per capita capacities
tqsu6s1  t0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3u.25 The first is the constrained/truncated DA
where students are allowed to rank up to K schools (K   6). The second setting, la-
belled as DA with cost, allows students to rank as many schools as they wish but
imposes a constant marginal cost c per additional school in the list after the first choice.
Student preferences over schools follow a random utility model:
ui,s  αs  di,s   3pai  a¯sq   i,s, (9)
where αs is school s’s fixed effect; di,s is the distance from student i’s residence to s; ai is i’s
ability; a¯s is school s’s quality; and i,s is randomly drawn from the type-I extreme value
distribution. Student priority indices are constructed such that (a) i’s priority index at
each school is correlated with her ability ai (correlation coefficient 0.7) and (b) i’s priority
indices at any two schools s and s1 are also correlated (correlation coefficient 0.7).
Several lessons can be drawn from these simulations. The first is that in both settings,
25Appendix C.2 describes the details on solving equilibrium. In general, there are multiple equilibria.
We focus on the one that is found by an algorithm iterating over the following steps: (i) for each candidate
ROL (a true partial preference order of the schools), every student calculates the admission probability
at each school by comparing her priority indices to the cutoff distribution; (ii) each student selects the
ROL that maximizes her expected utility; (iii) the matchings across M simulation samples jointly lead
to an updated cutoff distribution; (iv) students update the admission probabilities based on the updated
distribution. The initial cutoff distribution is the empirical cutoff distribution with strictly truth-telling
students, and steps (i)–(iv) are repeated until a fixed point in the cutoff distribution is found.
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(b) 500 students, 6 schools
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Figure 2: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of Economy Size on the Equilibrium Dis-
tribution of Cutoffs (Constrained/Truncated DA)
Notes: This figure shows the marginal distribution of school cutoffs in equilibrium under the constrained/truncated DA
(ranking 4 out of 6 schools) when varying the number of students, I, who compete for admission to 6 schools with a total
enrollment capacity of I  0.95 seats. Using 500 simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal
bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command. See Appendix C for details on the Monte Carlo simulations.
the distribution of school cutoffs is close to jointly normal and degenerates as school
capacities and the number of students increase proportionally while holding constant the
number of schools (Figure 2); the matching is almost stable (i.e., almost every student is
assigned to her favorite feasible school) even in moderately-sized economies. By contrast,
WTT is often violated among the majority of the students, even when they can rank 4 out
of 6 schools (constrained DA) or when the cost of including an extra school is negligibly
small (DA with cost).26 When the application cost increases, equilibrium strategies may
prescribe that many students rank fewer than 6 schools even though they are allowed to
rank all of them. Based on these results, observing that only a few students make full
use of their ranking opportunities may not be viewed as a compelling argument in favor
of truth-telling when the application cost is a legitimate concern.
The second insight is that stability leads to estimates much closer to the true val-
ues than WTT. Table 2 reports the results from estimation under each of the fol-
lowing assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling (columns 2–4); (ii) stability (columns 5–7);
and (iii) stability and undominated strategies (columns 8–10). Panel A is for the con-
strained/truncated DA where students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools; Panel B is
for the DA with a marginal application cost equal to 106.
26Consistent with Proposition 5, our simulations show that the fraction of students who are matched
with their favorite feasible school decreases with the application cost. However, students with justified
envy are rare unless students face very large application costs (see Figure C4 in the Appendix C.3).
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Table 2: Monte Carlo Results (500 Students, 6 Schools, 500 Samples)
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of
the matching
Stability and
undominated
strategies
True value Mean SD CP Mean SD CP Mean SD CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Constrained/Truncated DA (ranking up to 4 out of 6 schools)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.50 0.28 1.00
School 3 1.00 2.08 0.14 0.00 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.02 0.57 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.29 0.12 0.00 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.52 0.50 1.00
School 5 2.00 0.56 0.07 0.00 2.02 0.31 0.96 2.01 0.29 1.00
School 6 2.50 0.23 0.12 0.00 2.53 0.45 0.96 2.51 0.43 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 9.40 0.64 0.00 2.97 2.29 0.96 3.05 2.26 1.00
Distance 1.00 0.71 0.08 0.08 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.01 0.20 1.00
Summary statistics (averaged across Monte Carlo samples)
Average length of submitted ROLs 4.00
Fraction of weakly truth-telling students 0.39
Fraction of students assigned to favorite feasible school 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-Telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 100% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Panel B. DA with application cost (constant marginal cost c  106)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.88 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.49 0.28 1.00
School 3 1.00 0.57 0.16 0.23 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.00 0.53 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.17 0.15 0.37 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.49 0.48 1.00
School 5 2.00 1.74 0.11 0.32 2.02 0.30 0.96 1.99 0.29 1.00
School 6 2.50 2.24 0.14 0.50 2.54 0.45 0.96 2.48 0.41 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 2.19 0.72 0.77 2.96 2.29 0.96 3.16 2.29 1.00
Distance 1.00 0.93 0.09 0.88 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.00 0.20 1.00
Summary statistics (averaged across Monte Carlo samples)
Average length of submitted ROLs 4.60
Fraction of weakly truth-telling students 0.79
Fraction of students assigned to favorite feasible school 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-Telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 37% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Notes: This table reports Monte Carlo results from estimating students’ preferences under different set of identifying
assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling; (ii) stability; (iii) stability and undominated strategies. 500 Monte Carlo samples of
school choice data are simulated under two data generating processes for an economy in which 500 students compete for
admission to 6 schools: a constrained/truncated DA where students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools out of 6 (Panel A);
an unconstrained DA where students can rank as many schools as they wish, but incur a constant marginal cost c  106
for including an extra school in their ROL beyond the first choice (Panel B). Under assumptions (i) and (ii), student
preferences are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Under assumption (iii), they are estimated using Andrews
and Shi (2013)’s method of moment (in)equalities. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters. The mean and
standard deviation (SD) of point estimates across the Monte Carlo samples are reported in columns 2, 5 and 8, and in
columns 3, 6 and 9, respectively. Columns 4, 7 and 10 report the coverage probabilities (CP) for the 95 percent confidence
intervals. The confidence intervals in models (i) and (ii) are the Wald-type confidence intervals obtained from the inverse of
the Hessian matrix. The marginal confidence intervals in model (iii) are computed using the method proposed by Bugni et
al. (2017). Truth-telling is tested against stability by constructing a Hausman-type test statistic from the estimates of both
approaches. Stability is tested against undominated strategies by checking if the identified set of the moment (in)equality
model is empty, using the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015). See Appendix C for details on the Monte Carlo simulations.
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The WTT-based estimator (βˆTT ) is severely biased (column 2). Particularly in Panel A,
we note that low-ability students’ valuation of the most popular schools (e.g., School 6)
tends to be underestimated, because such schools are more likely to be omitted from
these students’ ROLs due to their low admission probabilities. This bias is also present
among small schools (e.g., Schools 3 and 4), which are often left out of ROLs because
their cutoffs tend to be higher than those of equally desirable but larger schools.
By contrast, the average of the stability-based estimates (βˆST ) is reasonably close to
the true values. Its standard deviations, however, are larger than those obtained under
WTT. This efficiency loss is a direct consequence of ignoring the information content of
ROLs.27 The Hausman test strongly rejects WTT in favor of stability.
The estimator based on moment (in)equalities (βˆMEI), which integrates stability with
information in ROLs, is also consistent (column 8). Moreover, the test based on mo-
ment (in)equalities never rejects the null hypothesis that stability is consistent with
undominated strategies. A limitation of this approach, however, is that the currently
available methods for conducting inference based on moment (in)equalities are typically
conservative. As a result, the 95 percent marginal confidence intervals based on moment
(in)equalities cover the true values too often (coverage probability, or CP, is close to one).
4 School Choice in Paris
Since 2008, the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris) assigns students to public
high schools based on a version of the school-proposing DA called AFFELNET (Hiller
and Tercieux, 2014). At the district level, student priority indices are not school-specific
(as detailed below) and the mechanism is equivalent to a serial dictatorship.
Towards the end of the Spring term, final-year middle school students who are ad-
mitted to the upper secondary academic track (Seconde Ge´ne´rale et Technologique)28
are requested to submit an ROL of up to 8 public high schools to the Paris Education
Authority. Students’ priority indices are determined as follows:
(i) Students’ academic performance during the last year of middle school is graded on
a scale of 400 to 600 points.
27Appendix C.4 further quantifies the efficiency loss in simulations with strictly truth-telling students.
28In the French educational system, students are tracked at the end of the final year of colle`ge (equiv-
alent to middle school), at the age of 15, into vocational or academic upper secondary education.
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(ii) Paris is divided into four districts. Students receive a “district” bonus of 600 points
at each school located in their home district. Thus, students applying to a within-
district school have full priority over out-of-district applicants to the same school.
(iii) Low-income students are awarded a bonus of 300 points.29 As a result, these stu-
dents are given full priority over all other students from the same district.
The DA algorithm is run at the end of the academic year to determine school as-
signment for the following academic year. Unassigned students can participate in a
supplementary round of admissions by submitting a new ROL of schools among those
with remaining seats, the assignment mechanism being the same as for the main round.
Note that the mechanism would be strategy-proof if there were no constraints on the
length of ROLs, because it is equivalent to serial dictatorship. Nonetheless, under the
current mechanism, it is still a dominated strategy to submit an ROL that is not a partial
order of true preferences (Proposition 2).
4.1 Data
For our empirical analysis, we use data from Paris’ Southern District (Sud) and study the
behaviors of 1,590 within-district middle school students who applied for admission to the
district’s 11 public high schools for the academic year 2013-14. Owing to the 600-point
“district” bonus, this district is essentially an independent market.30
Along with socio-demographic characteristics and home addresses, our data contain
all the relevant variables to replicate the matching algorithm, including the school capac-
ities, the submitted ROLs, and the priority indices (converted into percentiles between
0 and 1). Individual examination results for the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB)—a
national exam that all students take at the end of middle school—are used to construct
different measures of academic ability (French, math, and composite score), which are
normalized as percentiles between 0 and 1. Note that the DNB exam scores are not used
in the computation of the student priority index, which is based on the grades obtained
throughout the final year of middle school. The DNB scores therefore provide additional
29The low-income status is conditional on a student applying for and being granted the means-tested
low-income financial aid in the last year of middle school. A family with two children would be eligible
in 2013 if its taxable income was below 17,155 euros. The aid ranges from 135 to 665 euros per year.
30Out-of-district applicants could affect the availability of school seats in the supplementary round,
but this is of little concern since, in the district, only 22 students were unassigned at the end of the main
round (for the comparison between assigned and unassigned students, see Appendix Table E1).
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measures of student ability.31 Table 3 reports students’ characteristics, choices, and ad-
mission outcomes. Almost half of the students are of high socioeconomic status (SES),
while 15 percent receive the low-income bonus. 99 percent are assigned to a within-district
school in the main admission round, but only half obtain their first choice.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the 11 high schools. Columns 1–4 show a
high degree of stratification among the schools, both in terms of the average ability of
students enrolled in 2012 and of their social background (measured by the fraction of
high SES students). Columns 5–8 describe school choice in 2013. The district’s total
capacity (1,692 seats) is unevenly distributed across schools: the smallest school has
62 seats while the largest has 251. School cutoffs in 2013 are strongly correlated with
school quality. The last column shows the fraction of submitted ROLs in which each
school is ranked. The least popular three schools are each ranked by less than 24 percent
of students, and two of them remain under-subscribed (Schools 1 and 3) and thus have
a zero cutoff. Consistent with our Monte Carlo results, smaller schools are omitted by
more students, even if they are of high quality. Likewise, a sizeable fraction of students
(20 percent) do not rank the best-performing school (School 11) in their ROLs.
Enrollment data further reveals a high level of compliance with the assignment out-
come. Among the assigned students, 96 percent attend the school they were matched
with (Appendix Table E1), about 1 percent attend a public high school different from
their assignment school, and less than 3 percent opt out to enroll in a private school.
4.2 Evaluating the Assumptions: Reduced-Form Evidence
To evaluate the WTT and stability assumptions, we investigate if students are less likely
to rank schools at which they expect low admission probabilities. Similar to “skipping
the impossible” as in Example 1, this behavior would be inconsistent with WTT.
Figure 3 focuses on the district’s four most selective schools (as measured by their
cutoffs). For each school, we separately plot the fraction of students who rank it in
their ROL as a function of their distance to the school cutoff, measured by the difference
(using the original scale in points) between the student’s priority index and the cutoff.32
31See Appendix B for a description of the data sources and Appendix Figure E1 for a map.
32We restrict the sample for a school to students whose score is no more than 50 points away from its
cutoff. Due to the low-income bonus of 300 points, low-income students’ priority indices are always well
above the cutoffs. They are therefore not considered in the analysis.
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Table 3: High School Applicants in the Southern District of Paris: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Panel A. Student characteristics
Age 15.0 0.4 13 17 1,590
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 1,590
French score 0.56 0.25 0.00 1.00 1,590
Math score 0.54 0.24 0.01 1.00 1,590
Composite score 0.55 0.21 0.02 0.99 1,590
High SES 0.48 0.50 0 1 1,590
With low-income bonus 0.15 0.36 0 1 1,590
Panel B. Choices and outcomes
Number of choices within district 6.6 1.3 1 8 1,590
Assigned to a within-district school 0.99 0.12 0 1 1,590
Assigned to first choice school 0.56 0.50 0 1 1,590
Panel C. Attributes of first-choice school
Distance (km) 1.52 0.93 0.01 6.94 1,590
Mean student French score 0.62 0.11 0.32 0.75 1,590
Mean student math score 0.61 0.13 0.27 0.78 1,590
Mean student composite score 0.61 0.12 0.31 0.77 1,590
Fraction high SES in school 0.53 0.15 0.15 0.71 1,590
Panel D. Attributes of assigned school
Distance (km) 1.55 0.89 0.06 6.94 1,568
Mean student French score 0.56 0.12 0.32 0.75 1,568
Mean student math score 0.54 0.14 0.27 0.78 1,568
Mean student composite score 0.55 0.13 0.31 0.77 1,568
Fraction high SES in school 0.48 0.15 0.15 0.71 1,568
Notes: This table provides summary statistics on the choices of middle school students from the Southern District of
Paris who applied for admission to the district’s 11 public high schools for the academic year starting in 2013, based on
administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris). All scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme
national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured in percentiles and normalized to be in r0, 1s. The composite
score is the average of the scores in French and math. The correlation coefficient between French and math scores is 0.50.
School attributes, except distance, are measured by the average characteristics of students enrolled in each school in the
previous year (2012).
Table 4: High Schools in the Southern District of Paris: Summary Statistics
School attributes (2012) Assignment outcomes (2013)
Mean
French
score
Mean
math
score
Mean
composite
score
Fraction
high SES
students
Capacity Count
Admission
cutoffs
Fraction
ROLs
ranking it
School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
School 1 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.15 72 19 0.000 0.22
School 2 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.17 62 62 0.015 0.23
School 3 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.16 67 36 0.000 0.14
School 4 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.46 140 140 0.001 0.59
School 5 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.47 240 240 0.042 0.83
School 6 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.32 171 171 0.069 0.71
School 7 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.56 251 251 0.373 0.91
School 8 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.30 91 91 0.239 0.39
School 9 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.66 148 148 0.563 0.83
School 10 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.49 237 237 0.505 0.92
School 11 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.71 173 173 0.705 0.80
Notes: This tables provides summary statistics on the attributes of high schools in the Southern District of Paris and on
the outcomes of the 2013 assignment round, based on administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de
Paris). School attributes in 2012 are measured by the average characteristics of the schools’ enrolled students in 2012–2013.
All scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured in percentiles
and normalized to be in r0, 1s. The composite score is the average of the scores in French and math. The correlation
coefficient between school-average math and French scores is 0.97.
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Figure 3: Fraction of Students Ranking Each of the Four Most Selective Schools in the
Southern District of Paris, by Distance to School Cutoff
Notes: The results are calculated with data from the Paris Education Authority on students who applied to the 11 high
schools of the Southern District in 2013. The figure shows the ranking behavior of students as a function of the distance
(using the original scale in points) between each school’s cutoff and students’ priority index. For each school, the sample
only includes students with a priority index within 50 and +50 points of the cutoff, and students are grouped into bins
of 10-point width. Bins with less than 10 observations are excluded. Each point represents the fraction of students in a
given bin who rank the school in their list. The dotted lines show the 95 percent confidence interval. Low-income students
are not included because the low-income bonus of 300 points places them well above the cutoffs.
Each plot shows that almost all students with a priority index above a school’s cutoff
include that school in their ROL, whereas the fraction of students ranking the school
decreases rapidly when the priority index falls below the cutoff. Irrespective of strategic
considerations, one might expect high priority students to have a stronger preference
for the most selective schools—since priorities are positively correlated with academic
performance—and hence to rank them more often. However, the kink around the cutoffs is
consistent with students omitting the most selective schools from their ROL because of the
low admission probabilities. In Appendix D.1, we show that the kink-shaped relationship
between student priority index and their ranking behavior is robust to controlling for
potential determinants of preferences, including distance to school and the student’s
DNB exam scores in French and math. Recall that DNB scores are not used to calculate
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the priority indices. These results cannot be easily reconciled with truth-telling behavior.
The evidence in Figure 3 suggests the potential influence of expected admission prob-
abilities on student ranking behavior. At the time of application, students know their
academic grades and low-income status but not their priority ranking nor the ex post
cutoffs.33 They can, however, gather information on past cutoffs to assess admission
probabilities. While we do not have direct information on students’ beliefs, Figure 4
shows that the current year (2013) cutoffs are similar to those from the previous year
(2012).34 This lends support to the assumption that students have some ability to predict
their admission probabilities. Although not a necessary condition for the matching to be
stable, this feature makes the stability assumption more likely to be satisfied.
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Figure 4: School Cutoffs in 2012 and 2013
Notes: The results are calculated with administrative data from the Paris Education Authority. Each dot represents a
school, with its cutoff in 2013 on the Y-axis and the one in 2012 on the X-axis. The dashed line denotes the 45-degree line.
4.3 Estimation and Test Results
We parameterize student i’s utility of being matched with school s as follows:
ui,s  αs  di,s   Z 1i,sγ   λi,s, s  1, . . . , 11; (10)
33This uncertainty in both priority ranking and cutoffs may explain why some students find it optimal
to rank multiple schools, given that the cost of ranking up to 8 choices is arguably negligible.
34The comparison could not be performed for earlier years due to the modifications in the computation
of the priority index and the small changes in the set of available schools.
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where αs is the school fixed effect, di,s is the distance to s from i’s residence, and Zi,s is a
vector of student-school-specific observables. As observed heterogeneity, Zi,s includes two
variables that capture potential non-linearities in the disutility of distance and control
for potential behavioral biases towards certain schools: “closest school” is a dummy
variable equal to one if s is the closest to student i among all 11 schools; “high school
co-located with middle school” is another dummy that equals one if high school s and the
student’s middle school are co-located at the same address.35 To account for students’
heterogeneous valuation of school quality, interactions between student scores and school
scores are introduced separately for French and math, as well as an interaction between
own SES and the fraction of high SES students in the school. These school attributes are
measured among the entering class of 2012, whereas our focus is on students applying for
admission in 2013. We normalize the variables in Zi,s so that each school’s fixed effect
can be interpreted as the mean valuation, relative to School 1, of a non-high-SES student
who has median scores in both French and math, whose middle school is not co-located
with that high school, and for whom the high school is not the closest to her residence.
The error term i,s is assumed to be an i.i.d. type-I extreme value, and the variance of
unobserved heterogeneity is λ2 multiplied by the variance of i,s. The effect of distance is
normalized to 1, and, therefore, the fixed effects and γ are all measured in terms of will-
ingness to travel. As a usual position normalization, α1  0. We do not consider outside
options because of students’ almost perfect compliance with the assignment outcome.
Using the same procedures as in the Monte Carlo simulations (described in Ap-
pendix C), we obtain the results summarized in Table 5, where each column reports
estimates under a given set of identifying assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling (column 1);
(ii) stability (column 2); and (iii) stability with undominated strategies (column 3).36
The results provide clear evidence that the WTT-based estimates (column 1) are
rather different from the others. Specifically, a downward bias is apparent for popular
35There are five such high schools in the district.
36For the estimates in column 3, we use the method of moment (in)equalities where inequalities are
constructed as described in Section 2.5. Determined by Zi,s, we interact French score, math score, and
distances to Schools 1 and 2 with the conditional moments. Although one could use more variables,
e.g., SES status and distance to other schools, they provide little additional variation. In principle, the
assumption of undominated strategies alone implies partial identification (Section 2.5). Because stability
is not rejected by our test, we do not present results based on this approach (available upon request).
We note that the marginal confidence intervals from moment inequalities only turn out to be wide in our
empirical setting, and hence are relatively uninformative. The possible reasons are that the empirical
bounds for the probability of a preference ordering over a pair of schools are fairly wide, and that the
available methods to conduct inference based on moment inequalities are typically conservative.
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Table 5: Estimation Results under Different Sets of Identifying Assumptions
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of
the matching
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. School fixed effects
School 2 0.71 1.46 1.21
[1.17, 0.24] [0.64, 2.28] [0.14, 2.29]
School 3 2.12 1.03 0.84
[2.66, 1.58] [0.19, 1.86] [0.56, 2.01]
School 4 3.31 2.91 2.90
[2.75, 3.86] [2.07, 3.76] [2.36, 3.39]
School 5 5.13 4.16 4.16
[4.41, 5.84] [3.22, 5.10] [3.71, 4.49]
School 6 4.87 4.24 4.30
[4.21, 5.54] [3.29, 5.18] [3.73, 4.82]
School 7 7.33 6.81 6.24
[6.47, 8.18] [5.65, 7.98] [5.76, 7.28]
School 8 1.59 4.46 4.27
[1.10, 2.08] [3.46, 5.47] [2.98, 5.26]
School 9 6.84 7.77 6.57
[6.07, 7.61] [6.55, 8.99] [5.84, 7.26]
School 10 7.84 7.25 6.44
[6.94, 8.75] [6.01, 8.49] [5.87, 7.05]
School 11 5.35 7.28 5.61
[4.62, 6.08] [6.06, 8.51] [4.98, 7.33]
Panel B. Covariates
Closest school 0.37 0.19 0.15
[0.63, 0.11] [0.47, 0.10] [0.75, 0.57]
High school co-located 2.54 1.76 1.54
with middle school [2.02, 3.07] [1.19, 2.32] [0.17, 3.12]
Student French score [10] 0.20 0.18 0.23
 school French score [10] [0.16, 0.23] [0.13, 0.24] [0.10, 0.35]
Student math score [10] 0.30 0.27 0.30
 school math score [10] [0.26, 0.34] [0.21, 0.32] [0.18, 0.40]
High SES 6.79 4.92 8.12
 fraction high SES in school [5.62, 7.97] [3.31, 6.54] [4.18, 12.55]
Scaling parameter 3.09 1.33 1.50
[2.79, 3.38] [1.16, 1.50] [1.20, 1.64]
Number of students 1,590 1,568 1,590
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the parameters in Equation (10) for the Southern District of Paris, with the
coefficient on distance being normalized to 1. The point estimates in columns 1 and 2 are based on maximum likelihood,
whereas those in column 3 are based on moment equalities and inequalities, with 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets.
Model selection tests: A Hausman test, testing (1) against (2), rejects WTT in favor of stability (p-value   0.01); a test
based on moment equalities and inequalities does not reject the null hypothesis that stability is consistent with undominated
strategies at the 5 percent significance level.
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schools that are not ranked by many students, such as Schools 8 and 11. School 8, which
is omitted by 61 percent of students, is deemed by WTT to be less desirable than all the
schools included in the ROL, which leads to a low estimated fixed effect. Similarly, the
fixed effect estimate of School 11, one of the most popular schools, varies substantially
across the identifying assumptions. The under-estimation is mitigated when the model
is estimated under a different assumption (columns 2 and 3). Provided that the model is
correctly specified, the Hausman test rejects WTT in favor of stability (p-value   0.01);
the test based on moment (in)equalities does not reject the null hypothesis that stability
is consistent with undominated strategies at the 5 percent significance level.
The results show that “closest school” has no significant effect, but students signif-
icantly prefer co-located schools. Compared with low-score students, those with high
French (math) scores have a stronger preference for schools with higher French (math)
scores. Moreover, high SES students prefer schools that have admitted a larger fraction
of high SES students in the previous year (2012).
Although the WTT-based estimates of the coefficients of covariates (Panel B) are not
markedly different from the stability-based estimates, one cannot conclude that the WTT
assumption produces reasonable results, as shown by the estimates of fixed effects. To
provide a better evaluation, we now compare the estimators by their model fit.
4.4 Goodness of Fit
In three dimensions (cutoffs, assignment, and revealed preferences), we compare the ob-
served values to those predicted by the estimates from Table 5. This comparison reveals
that the stability-based estimates fit the data well, as opposed to those based on WTT
(see Appendix D.2 for computational details).
Specifically, Figure 5 and Appendix Table D2 show that the stability-based estimates
(with or without undominated strategies) predict cutoffs close to the observed ones.37 By
contrast, WTT substantially under-predicts the cutoffs of the most popular schools.
Panel A of Table 6 compares each student’s predicted assignment to the observed one.
The stability-based estimates have 33–38 percent success rates, whereas the WTT-based
estimates accurately predict only 22 percent of the assignments. In Panel B, we take as
37It should be emphasized that the stability-based estimation does not try to fit cutoffs directly, neither
does it restrict a student’s preferences over infeasible schools. The difference in predicted cutoffs between
stability and WTT is solely due to their differences in predicting preferences.
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Figure 5: Goodness of Fit: Observed vs. Simulated Cutoffs
Notes: This figure compares the cutoffs observed for the 11 high schools of Paris’ Southern District in 2013 to those
simulated with the three sets of estimates in Table 5. The simulated cutoffs are averaged over 300 simulated samples. See
Appendix D.2 for details.
given the schools that a student has included in her submitted ROL, and compute the
probability of observing this particular preference order among the ranked schools. The
observed order of students’ top two choices has a mean predicted probability of 60 or
62 percent based on the stability-based estimates, higher than the 55 percent achieved
by the WTT-based estimates. We next consider the observed order of a student’s full
list of choices. Again, the stability-based estimates outperform those based on WTT,
with an average predicted probability between 2.2 and 2.5 percent for the former versus
1.2 percent for the latter. The predictive power of the stability-based estimates along the
two measures in Panel B is noteworthy because the prediction is partly out of sample.38
5 Summary and Discussion
As a summary of the results, we clarify when each approach is more appropriate for
empirical analysis. We also discuss whether the results can be extended to the school-
proposing DA, the case with non-equilibrium behavior, and settings beyond school choice.
5.1 Choosing among the Approaches: A Summary
In the preference estimation with real-life data from centralized school choice and college
admissions, some practical considerations should be taken into account. Recall that we
38In the data, 54 percent of students ranked at least one infeasible school among their top two choices
(34 percent ranked one infeasible school, while 20 percent ranked two). The average fraction of infeasible
schools among all submitted choices is 30 percent.
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Table 6: Goodness-of-Fit Measures Based on Different Sets of Identifying Assumptions
Estimates from
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of
the matching
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Simulated vs. observed assignment (300 simulated samples)
Mean predicted fraction of students 0.220 0.383 0.326
assigned to observed assignment (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Panel B. Predicted vs. observed partial preference order of given schools
Mean predicted probability that a student
prefers the top-ranked school to the 0.553 0.615 0.595
2nd-ranked in her submitted ROL
Mean predicted probability that a student’s partial
preference order among the schools in her ROL 0.012 0.025 0.022
coincides with the submitted rank order
Notes: This table reports two sets of goodness-of-fit measures comparing the observed outcomes to those predicted under
the different sets of identifying assumptions as in Table 5, for the high school assignment of students in the Southern District
of Paris. Panel A compares students’ observed assignment with their predicted assignment in 300 simulated samples. In
all simulations, we vary only the utility shocks, which are kept common across columns 1–3 (see Appendix D.2 for details).
Predicted and observed assignments are compared by computing the average predicted fraction of students who are assigned
to their observed assignment school, with standard deviations across the simulation samples reported in parentheses; in
other words, this is the average fraction of times each student is assigned to her observed assignment in the 300 simulated
samples. Panel B uses two measures to compare students’ observed partial preference order of given schools (revealed in
their submitted ROL) with the prediction, among students who rank at least two schools: (i) mean predicted probability
that a student prefers the top-ranked school to the 2nd-ranked in her submitted ROL, which is averaged across students;
and (ii) mean predicted probability that a student’s partial preference order among the schools in her ROL coincides with
the submitted rank order. Due to the logit specification, those probabilities can be calculated without simulation.
focus on the strict-priority setting in which students are ranked based on strict priority
indices that are ex ante known privately. Building on the results from our theoretical and
empirical analyses, this section emphasizes some of the key market features that deserve
careful examination when one decides which approach to use in a given context.
The Nesting Structure of Identifying Assumptions. Our results imply that the
identifying assumptions follow a nesting structure, as depicted in Figure 6.
Truth-telling is a natural candidate identifying assumption because of DA’s strategy-
proofness. However, strict truth-telling (i.e., students truthfully rank all schools) is not
an equilibrium, if students cannot rank all schools at no cost (Proposition 1). In real-life
data, students seldom rank all schools, which calls for a weaker version of the truth-telling
assumption. As clarified in the theoretical analysis, weak truth-telling (i.e., students
truthfully rank their most preferred schools and omit some least preferred ones) does not
follow directly from strategy-proofness, as it requires additional assumptions such as the
length of ROLs being independent of preferences.
Stability is an even weaker assumption on student behavior, while still allowing for the
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Figure 6: Nesting Structure of Identifying Assumptions
Notes: This figure shows the nesting structure of the identifying assumptions that can be used to analyze data generated by
DA and its variants in the strict-priority setting. The numbered areas correspond to different combinations of identifying
assumptions: 1 strict truth-telling; 2 weak truth-telling and stability; 3 weak truth-telling without stability; 4 stability
and undominated strategies; 5 stability without undominated strategies; 6 undominated strategies without stability.
identification of preferences. It states that every student is assigned to her favorite ex post
feasible school, and is always satisfied when students are strictly truth-telling. Although
stability is not guaranteed in all Bayesian Nash equilibria, even when students are weakly
truth-telling, it is asymptotically satisfied when the economy grows large (Proposition 4).
The third candidate identifying assumption is that students do not play dominated
strategies (Proposition 2), so that submitted ROLs reveal students’ partial preference
orders of schools. Weak truth-telling is a special case of this more general assumption,
whereas stability may hold even if students play dominated strategies.
The Choice of Empirical Approaches. When choosing among the candidate iden-
tifying assumptions, consideration should be given to the features of the problem under
study, as well as the available data. For each assumption, Table 7 summarizes the features
making it more plausible, the required data, and some discussion about identification and
estimation. Truth-telling is more likely to be satisfied when students can rank as many
schools as they wish at no cost, and face large uncertainty about each school’s exact rank-
ing of students. Conditional on students’ submitted ROLs being observed, preferences
can be estimated using either MLE or GMM. The choice between weak truth-telling and
strict truth-telling depends on whether students rank all schools (Section 2.2) and on the
importance of outside options (Appendix A.4).
When students face some cost of ranking more schools (e.g., if the length of submit-
table ROLs is restricted), stability can be a more plausible assumption than truth-telling.
43
Table 7: Summary of Empirical Approaches
Identifying assumption
What makes the assumption more
plausible?
Required
data
Identification
and estimation
Weak Truth-Telling:
Schools in a submitted ROL
are ranked in true preference
order and omitted ones are less
preferred.
(1) No cost of ranking more schools, e.g., no
restriction on the length of submittable ROLs and
choice set not being too large. (2) At the time of
application, each student knows her own priority
index but not others’, and the distribution of
priority indices has a large variance.
Submitted ROLs
Point identification
Estimation by, e.g.,
MLE/GMM
Stability of the matching:
Every student is assigned to
her favorite feasible school.
Priority indices and unobserved
preference heterogeneity are
conditionally independent.
Stability is satisfied if truth-telling holds and
(almost) everyone is assigned. Otherwise, it is
more likely to be true when (1) market is large
(many students, big schools); (2) students are less
constrained when applying to more schools;
(3) students face limited uncertainty about how
schools rank them at the time of application;
(4) students know more about others’ preferences;
or (5) cutoffs are easy to predict.
Admission outcome,
school capacities,
priority indices
Point identification
Estimation by, e.g.,
MLE/GMM
Undominated strategies:
Submitted ROLs are true
partial preference orders.
(1) No “safety school” so that “irrelevance at the
bottom” of one’s ROL is less likely. (2) No
“impossible school” so that students do not rank
impossible school arbitrarily.
Submitted ROLs
Partial identification
Estimation using
moment inequalities
Stability and Undominated
strategies:
See the conditions laid out
separately for stability and
undominated strategies.
See the conditions laid out separately for stability
and undominated strategies.
Submitted ROLs,
admission outcome,
school capacities,
priority indices
Point identification
Estimation using
moment equalities and
moment inequalities
Notes: This table describes the empirical approaches to analyses of data generated by DA and its variants in the strict-
priority setting. In addition, there are two tests available: (i) weak truth-telling can be tested against stability (H0: both
weak truth-telling and stability are satisfied; H1: only stability is satisfied), e.g., using the Hausman (1978) or Hansen
(1982) tests; (ii) stability can be tested against undominated strategies (H0: both stability and undominated strategies are
satisfied; H1: only the undominated-strategies assumption is satisfied) using the approach in Bugni et al. (2015).
This assumption is more likely to hold when the market is larger (i.e., many students
and many seats per school), when students are less constrained in applying to multiple
schools (e.g., longer ROLs), when they are less uncertain about each school’s ranking of
all students at the time of application, when they know more about others’ preferences, or
when it is easier for them to predict school cutoffs (Proposition 5). Our Monte Carlo sim-
ulations additionally provide numerical evidence suggesting that stability is a plausible
assumption even when students face non-negligible application costs (Appendix C.3).
Estimating preferences based on stability uses information on the admission outcome,
the school capacities, and the priority indices, but has the advantage of not requiring data
on submitted ROLs. However, it is necessary to assume the conditional independence
between priority index and unobserved preference heterogeneity. Compared to truth-
telling, the main cost of the stability-based approach is its limited power to identify rich
substitution patterns, because the information content of ROLs is discarded.
Weak truth-telling does not always imply stability, but it does imply no-blocking
among all assigned students (Proposition 3). Therefore, weak truth-telling can be tested
against stability (or no-blocking among assigned students) using the Hausman (1978) and
Hansen (1982) tests. It should be emphasized that these tests do not provide definitive
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proof against truth-telling unless the model is correctly specified and identified.
If it is believed that neither truth-telling nor stability is likely to be satisfied, pref-
erences can still be partially identified under the assumption that students do not play
dominated strategies. This assumption is more plausible when no school is either “safe”
or “impossible” for students, making it less likely that students rank some schools in
an arbitrary manner. Submitted ROLs can then be used to form conditional moment
inequalities that partially identify preferences.
When the conditions for both stability and undominated-strategies assumptions are
jointly satisfied, the moment inequalities from the latter assumption provide over-identifying
information that can be integrated with the stability assumption to estimate prefer-
ences based on all of the available data (ROLs, matching outcome, school capacities,
and priority indices). Additionally, the stability assumption can be tested against the
undominated-strategies assumption using the specification test in Bugni et al. (2015).
5.2 Discussion and Extension
The School-Proposing DA. Our main results can be extended to the school-proposing
DA, which is also commonly used in practice (see Table 1). Under this mechanism, schools
“propose” to students following the order of student priority indices. Proposition 2 no
longer holds; that is, students might have incentives not to report a true partial pref-
erence order (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). Nonetheless, the asymptotic stability result
(Proposition 4) is still valid, as its proof does not rely on Proposition 2. Indeed, the
matching can be stable in equilibrium (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
To summarize, if the market under the school-proposing DA has features making
the matching stable (see Table 7), we can formulate identification and estimation of
student preferences based on stability. However, the truth-telling assumption no longer
has theoretical support, as the school-proposing DA is not strategy-proof for students
(Roth, 1982). The approach based on undominated strategies does not apply either, since
there are no dominated strategies under this mechanism (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
Non-Equilibrium Strategies. We have thus far assumed that everyone plays an equi-
librium strategy with a common prior. More realistically, some students could have
different information and make mistakes when strategizing.
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Indeed, a growing number of studies find that strategic mistakes are common even in
strategy-proof environments. Laboratory experiments show that a significant fraction of
subjects do not report their preferences truthfully in strategy-proof mechanisms (Chen
and So¨nmez, 2006). More relevantly, mistakes occur in real-world contexts, e.g., the
admissions to Israeli graduate programs in psychology (Hassidim et al., 2016), the medical
resident match in the U.S. (Rees-Jones, 2018), and the Australian university admissions
(Artemov et al., 2017). Without estimating preferences, these studies show that a non-
negligible fraction of participants make unambiguous mistakes in their ROLs.
However, the vast majority of these mistakes are not payoff relevant. In other words,
although some students play dominated strategies, the matching is still close to stable,
corresponding to area 5 in Figure 6. Based on these observations, the results in Artemov
et al. (2017) imply that, as identifying restrictions, assuming stability can be more robust
and more plausible than the assumption of undominated strategies.
Beyond School Choice and College Admissions. Although the analysis has fo-
cused on school choice and college admissions, our results can apply to certain assign-
ment procedures based on DA. Let us call agents on the two sides “applicants” and
“recruiters,” respectively. The key requirement is that when applying, applicants have
sufficiently precise information on how recruiters rank them and that researchers observe
how recruiters exactly rank applicants.39 Examples include the assignment of teachers to
schools in France (Combe et al., 2016) and the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme
matching medical school graduates with training programs (Irving, 2011). The estimation
approaches discussed in Section 2 could be implemented in these settings.
6 Conclusion
We present novel approaches to estimating student preferences with school choice or col-
lege admissions data generated by the popular Deferred Acceptance mechanism when
applicants are ranked strictly by some ex-ante known priority index. We provide theo-
retical and empirical evidence showing that, in this commonly observed setting, it can
be rather restrictive to assume that students truthfully rank schools when applying for
39Without information on how either side ranks the other, it becomes the classical two-sided matching,
and additional assumptions are needed for identification and estimation (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2016).
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admission. Instead, stability (or justified-envy-freeness) of the matching provides rich
identifying information, while being a weaker assumption on student behavior. Assum-
ing that students do not play dominated strategies, we also discuss methods with moment
inequalities, which can be useful with or without stability. A series of tests are proposed
to guide the selection of the appropriate approach.
The estimation and testing methods are illustrated with Monte Carlo simulations.
When applied to school choice data from Paris, our results are more consistent with
stability than with truth-telling. Reduced-form evidence on ranking behavior suggests
that some students omit the most selective schools from their list because of low admission
probabilities. Provided that the model is correctly specified, our proposed tests reject
truth-telling but not stability. Compared with our preferred estimates based on stability
(with or without imposing undominated strategies), assuming truth-telling leads to an
under-estimation of preferences for popular or small schools. Moreover, the stability-
based estimators outperform the truth-telling-based estimator in predicting matching
outcomes and student preferences.
Our approaches are applicable to many school choice and college admissions systems
around the world, as well as to other matching schemes such as teacher assignment in
France and medical matching in Scotland.
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Appendix A Proofs and Additional Results
Section A.1 collects the proofs and additional results for a finite economy, while those
related to asymptotics and the continuum economy are presented in Section A.2.
A.1 Finite Economy: Proofs from Sections 1.2 and 1.3
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) Sufficiency. Without application cost, STT is a dominant strategy (Dubins and
Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982), so we only need to prove it is the unique equilibrium.
Suppose that a non-STT strategy, σ, is another equilibrium. Without loss of gener-
ality, let us assume σ is in pure strategy.
Since STT is a weakly dominant strategy, it implies that, for any i and any θi P ΘI1,
S¸
s1
ui,sas prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq ¥
S¸
s1
ui,sas pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq ,
in which both terms are non-negative given the assumptions on G. Moreover, σ being an
equilibrium means that, for any i:
S¸
s1
ui,s
»
as prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq dGpθiq ¤
S¸
s1
ui,s
»
as pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq dGpθiq.
It therefore must be that, for any i and any θi P ΘI1 except a measure-zero set of θi,
S¸
s1
ui,sas prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq 
S¸
s1
ui,sas pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq . (A.1)
Through the following claims, we then show that σ must be STT, i.e., σpθiq  rpuiq.
Claim 1 : σpθiq and rpuiq have the same top choice.
Proof of Claim 1 : Given the full support of G, there is a positive probability that
i’s priority indices at all schools are the highest among all students. In this event, i is
accepted by r1i (her most preferred school) when submitting rpuiq and accepted by the
top choice in σpθiq when submitting σpθiq. As preferences are strict, σpθiq must have r1i
as the top choice to have Equation (A.1) satisfied.
Claim 2 : σpθiq and rpuiq have the same top two choices.
Proof of Claim 2 : From Claim 1, we know that σpθiq and rpuiq agree on their top
choices. Given G’s full support, there is a positive probability that i’s type and others’
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types are such that: (a) i’s priority index is the lowest among all students at school r1i ;
(b) i’s priority index is the highest among all students at all other schools; and (c) all other
students have r1i as their most preferred school. In this event, by Claim 1, all students
rank r1i as top choice. Therefore, i is rejected by r
1
i , but she is definitely accepted by her
second choice. Because STT means she is accepted by r2i , Equation (A.1) implies that
σpθiq must also rank r2i as the second choice. This proves the claim.
We can continue proving a series of similar claims that σpθiq and rpuiq must agree
on top S choices. In other words, σpθiq  rpuiq. This proves that there is no non-STT
equilibrium, and, therefore, STT is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Necessity. The following shows that the zero-application-cost condition is nec-
essary for STT to be an equilibrium strategy for every student type.
Without loss of generality, suppose that CpSq  CpS  1q ¡ 0 , which implies that
applying to the Sth choice is costly. Let σSTT be the STT strategy. Let us consider
students whose Sth choice in terms of true preferences, rSi , has a low cardinal value.
More specifically, ui,rSi   CpSq  CpS  1q. For such students, σSTT is a dominated
strategy, dominated by dropping rSi and submitting pr1i , . . . , rSi q. In other words, σSTT is
not an equilibrium strategy for these students.
In fact, σSTT is not an equilibrium strategy for more student types, given others play-
ing σSTT . If a student drops an arbitrary school s and submits a partial true preference
order Li of length pS  1q, the saved cost of is CpSq  CpS  1q, while the associated
foregone benefit is at most ui,s
³
as
 
Li, ei;σ
STT
i pθiq, ei

dGpθiq. The saved cost can
exceed the forgone benefit because the latter can be close to zero when s tends to have
cutoff much higher than ei,s or when i can be almost certainly accepted by more desirable
schools, given that everyone else plays STT. When it is the case, i deviates from STT.
The above arguments can be extended to any non-zero application cost. 
Proof of Lemma 1.
The sufficiency of the first statement is implied by the strategy-proofness of DA and
by DA producing a stable matching when everyone is STT. That is, STT is a dominant
strategy if C p|L|q  0 for all L, which always leads to stability.
To prove its necessity, it suffices to show that there is no dominant strategy when
C p|L|q ¡ 0 for some L P L.
If C p|L|q   8 for some L, we are in the case of the constrained/truncated DA, and
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it is well known that there is no dominant strategy (see, e.g., Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
Now suppose that 0   C p|L|q    8 for some L P L. If a strategy ranks fewer than
S schools with a positive probability, we know that it cannot be a dominant strategy for
the same reason as in the contrained/truncated DA. If a strategy does always rank all
schools, then it is weakly dominated by STT. We therefore need to show that STT is not
a dominant strategy for all student types, for which we can construct an example where
it is profitable for a student to drop some schools from her ROL to save application costs
for some profiles of ROLs submitted by other students.
Therefore, there is no dominant strategy when C p|L|q ¡ 0 for some L P L, and hence
stability cannot be an equilibrium outcome in dominant strategy.
The second statement is implied by Proposition 1 and that DA produces a stable
matching when everyone is STT. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that given a realized matching µˆ, there is a student-school pair pi, sq such
that µˆpθiq  H, ui,s ¡ ui,µˆpθiq, and ei,s ¥ Pspµˆq. That is, i is not matched with her
favorite feasible school.
Since i is weakly truth-telling, she must have ranked all schools that are more preferred
to µˆpθiq, including s. The DA algorithm implies that i must have been rejected by s at
some round given that she is accepted by a lower-ranked school µˆpθiq. As i is rejected by
s in some round, the cutoff of s must be higher than ei,s. This contradiction rules out
the existence of such matchings.
(ii) Given the result in part (i), when every student who has at least one feasible
school is matched, everyone must be assigned to her favorite feasible school. Moreover,
unmatched students have no feasible school. Therefore, the matching is stable. 
A.2 Asymptotics: Proofs and Additional Results
We now present the proofs of results in the main text as well as some additional results
on the asymptotics and the continuum economy.
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A.2.1 Matching and the DA Mechanism in the Continuum Economy
We follow Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016) to extend the
definitions of matching and DA to the continuum economy, E.
Similar to that in finite economies, a matching in E is a function µ : Θ Ñ S Y tHu,
such that (i) µ pθiq  s if student i is matched with s; (ii) µ pθiq  H if student i is
unmatched; (iii) µ1psq is measurable and is the set of students matched with s, while
Gpµ1psqq ¤ qs; and (iv) for any s P S, the set tθ P Θ : ui,µpθq ¤ ui,su is open.
The last condition is imposed because in the continuum model it is always possible
to add a measure-zero set of students to a school without exceeding its capacity. This
would generate multiplicities of stable matchings that differ only in sets of measure zero.
Condition (iv) rules out such multiplicities. The intuition is that the condition implies
that a stable matching always allows an extra measure zero set of students into a school
when this can be done without compromising stability.
The DA algorithm works almost the same as in a finite economy. Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al. (2015) formally define the algorithm, and prove that it converges. A sketch of the
mechanism is as follows. At the first step, each student applies to her most preferred
school. Every school tentatively admits up to its capacity from its applicants according
to its priority order, and rejects the rest if there are any. In general, each student who was
rejected in the previous step applies to her next preferred school. Each school considers
the set of students it has tentatively admitted and the new applicants. It tentatively
admits up to its capacity from these students in the order of its priority, and rejects
the rest. The process converges when the set of students that are rejected has zero
measure. Although this process might not complete in finite time, it converges in the
limit (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2015).
A.2.2 Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
We start with some intermediate results. Similar to Azevedo and Leshno (2016), we
define the convergence of tF pIquIPN to E if qpIq converges to q and if GpIq converges to
G in the weak-* topology.A.1 We similarly define the convergence of tF pIq, σpIquIPN to
A.1The weak-* convergence of measures is defined as
³
XdGˆpIq Ñ
³
XdG for every bounded continuous
function X : r0, 1s2S Ñ R, given a sequence of realized empirical distributions tGˆpIquIPN. This is also
known as narrow convergence or weak convergence.
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pE, σ8q, additionally requiring the empirical distributions of ROLs prescribed by σpIq in
finite economies to converge to those in E prescribed by σ8.
Lemma A1. For a sequence of random economies and equilibrium strategies tF pIq, σpIquIPN
satisfying Assumption 2, P pIq, the random cutoff associated with pF pIq, σpIqq, converges to
P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely.
Proof of Lemma A1.
First, we note that the sequence of random economies tF pIquIPN converges to E almost
surely. By construction, qpIq converges to q. Moreover, by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem,
the empirical distribution functions GpIq converge to G in the weak-* topology almost
surely. Therefore, we have that tF pIquIPN converges to E almost surely.
Second, we show that tF pIq, σpIquIPN converges to pE, σ8q almost surely. As σpIq and
σ8 map student types to ROLs, tF pIq, σpIquIPN is a sequence of random economies that
are defined with ROLs. A student’s “type” is now characterized by pLi, eiq P L r0, 1sS.
Let M8 be the probability measure on the modified student types in pE, σ8q. That is,
for any Λ  L  r0, 1sS, M8pΛq  Gptθi P Θ | pσ8pθiq, eiq P Λuq. Similarly, M pIq is the
empirical distribution of the modified types in the random economy tF pIq, σpIqu. We shall
show that M pIq converges to M8 in the weak-* topology almost surely.
Let X : L  r0, 1sS Ñ rx, xs  R be a bounded continuous function. We also define
M
pIq
σ8 the random probability measure on L  r0, 1sS when students play σ8 in random
economy F pIq. Because the strategy is fixed at σ8 for all I, by the same arguments
as above (i.e., the convergence of qpIq to q and the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem), M
pIq
σ8
converges to M8 almost surely.
Let ΘpIq  tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiqu. We have the following results:» XdM pIq  » XdM8
¤
» XdM pIq  » XdM pIqσ8   » XdM pIqσ8  » XdM8

» XpσpIqpθiq, eiqdGpIq  » Xpσ8pθiq, eiqdGpIq  » XdM pIqσ8  » XdM8

»
θiPΘpIq

XpσpIqpθiq, eiq Xpσp8qpθiq, eiq

dGpIq
  » XdM pIqσ8  » XdM8
¤px xqGpIqpΘpIqq  
» XdM pIqσ8  » XdM8 ,
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where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality; the equalities are because of
the definitions of M pIq and M
pIq
σ8 and because XpσpIqpθiq, eiq  Xpσ8pθiq, eiq whenever
θi R ΘpIq; the last inequality comes from the boundedness of X.
Because limIÑ8GpΘpIqq  0 by Assumption 1 and GpIq converges to G almost surely,
limIÑ8G
pIqpΘpIqq  0 almost surely. Moreover, M pIqσ8 converges to M8 almost surely, and
thus the above inequalities implies
³
XdM pIq converges to
³
XdM8 almost surely. By the
Portmanteau theorem, M pIq converge to M8 in the weak-* topology almost surely.
This proves tF pIq, σpIquIPN converges to pE, σ8q almost surely. By Proposition 3 of
Azevedo and Leshno (2016), P pIq converges to P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely. 
Proposition A1. Given Assumption 1, in a sequence of random economies and equilib-
rium strategies tF pIq, σpIquIPN satisfying Assumption 2, µpE, σ8q  µ8 and thus σ8pθiq
ranks µ8pθiq for all θi P Θ except a measure-zero set of student types.
Proof of Proposition A1.
Suppose that the first statement in the proposition is not true, Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σ8qpθiq 
µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 and therefore P pE, σ8q  P8. Because there is a unique stable matching
in E, which is the unique equilibrium outcome, by Assumption 1, µpE,σ8q is not stable
and thus is not an equilibrium outcome.
Recall that P pE, σ8q, P8, µpE,σ8q, and µ8 are constants, although their counterparts
in finite economies are random variables. Moreover, σpIq and σ8 are not random either.
For some η, ξ ¡ 0, we define:
Θpη,ξq 
$''''''&''''''%
θi P Θ

ei,µ8pθiq  P8µ8pθiq ¡ η,
ei,µpE,σ8qpθiq  PµpE,σ8qpθiqpµpE,σ8qq ¡ η,
ei,s  PspµpE,σ8qq   η, for all s ranked above µpE,σ8qpθiq by σ8pθiq;
ui,µ8pθiq  ui,µpE,σ8qpθiq ¡ ξ.
,//////.//////-
,
Θpη,ξq must have a positive measure for some η, ξ ¡ 0 and is a subset of students who can
form a blocking pair in µpE,σ8q. Clearly, σ
8pθiq ranks µpE,σ8qpθiq but not µ8pθiq for all
θi P Θpη,ξq. We further define:
Θ
pIq
pη,ξq  Θpη,ξq X tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq ranks µpE,σ8qpθiq but not µ8pθiqu.
By Assumption 2, σpIq converges to σ8, and thus Θ
pIq
pη,ξq converges to Θpη,ξq and has a
positive measure when I is sufficiently large.
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We show below that tσpIquIPN is not a sequence of equilibrium strategies. Consider a
unilateral deviation for θi P ΘpIqpη,ξq from σpIqpθiq to Li such that the only difference between
the two actions is that µpE,σ8qpθiq, ranked in σpIqpθiq, is replaced by µ8pθiq in Li while Li
is kept as a partial order of i’s true preferences.
By Lemma A1, for 0   φ   ξ{p1   ξq there exists n P N such that, in all F pIq with
I ¡ n, i is matched with µpE,σ8qpθiq with probability at least p1φq if submitting σpIqpθiq
but would have been matched with µ8pθiq if instead Li had been submitted.
Let EUpσpIqpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpIqpθiq. Then EUpσpIqpθiqq ¤
p1φqui,µpE,σ8qpθiq φ because maxstui,su ¤ 1 by assumption, and EUpLiq ¥ p1φqui,µ8pθiq.
The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpIqpθiqq ¥p1 φqui,µ8pθiq  p1 φqui,µpE,σ8qpθiq  φ
¥p1 φqξ  φ ¡ 0,
which proves that tσpIquIPN is not a sequence of equilibrium strategies. This contradiction
further shows that Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σ8qpθiq  µ8pθiquq  0 and that σ8pθiq ranks µ8pθiq
for all θi P Θ except a measure-zero set of student types. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part (i) is implied by Lemma A1 and Proposition A1. Because F pIq converges to
E almost surely and σpIq converges to σ8, P pIq converges to P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely.
Moreover, µpE,σ8q  µ8 except a measure-zero set of students implies that P pµpE,σ8qq 
P8. Therefore, limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8 almost surely.
To show part (ii), we first define ΘpIq  tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiqu. By Assumption 1,
GpIqpΘpIqq converges to zero almost surely. We have the following inequalities:
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,s
+
¤
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,s
+
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
 GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
¤GpIq   θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq( GpIq   θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq( ,
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where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality; the second inequality is because 
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P pIqq ui,s
(
and
 
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P8q ui,s
(
can
possibly differ only when Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq and because:#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
  θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq( .
Furthermore,
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq
(
GpIq  tθi P Θ | minpP8s , P pIqs q ¤ ei,s   maxpP8s , P pIqs q, Ds P Su .
The right hand side converges to zero almost surely, because almost surely GpIq converges
to G, which is atomless, and limnÑ8 P
pIq  P8 almost surely. Therefore,
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq
(  0 almost surely. (A.2)
Moreover,
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
(
¤GpIqpΘpIqq  GpIq   θi P ΘzΘpIq | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq(
¤GpIqpΘpIqq  GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq ¡ ui,µ8pθiq & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P pIqµpIqpθiq
)	
 GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq   ui,µ8pθiq, ei,µ8pθiq   P pIqµ8pθiq, & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P
pIq
µpIqpθiq
)	
In the first inequality, we decompose the student type space into two, ΘpIq and ΘzΘpIq. In
the former, students do not adopt σ8, while those in the latter set do and thus rank the
school prescribed by µ8. The second inequality consider the events when µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
can possibly happen.
The almost-sure convergence of GpIq to G and that of P pIq to P8 implies that:
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq ¡ ui,µ8pθiq & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P pIqµpIqpθiq
)	
 0 almost surely,
because for any s such that ui,s ¡ ui,µ8pθiq, we must have ei,s   P8s .
Similarly, almost surely,
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq   ui,µ8pθiq, ei,µ8pθiq   P pIqµ8pθiq, & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P
pIq
µpIqpθiq
)	
 0.
Therefore, GpIq
  
θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
(  0 almost surely. Together with (A.2),
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it implies that GpIq
  
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P pIqq ui,s
(
converges to zero almost
surely. In other words, tµpIquIPN is asymptotically stable. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
The first statement in part (i) is implied by Proposition 2. Suppose that i is in a
blocking pair with some school s. It means that the ex post cutoff of s is lower than i’s
priority index at s. Therefore, if s P LpIqi , the stability of DA (with respect to ROLs)
implies that i must be accepted by s or by schools ranked above and thus preferred to
s. Therefore, i and s cannot form a blocking pair if s P LpIqi , which proves the second
statement in part (i).
Part (iii) is implied by Proposition 4 (part (i)).
To show part (ii), we let SpIq0  SzLpIqi and therefore:
B
pIq
i PrpDs P S0, ui,s ¡ ui,µpIqpθiq and ei,s ¥ P pIqs q
¤
¸
sPSpIq0
Pr

ei,t   P pIqt , @t P LpIqi , s.t., ui,t ¡ ui,s; ei,s ¥ P pIqs
	
.
Let B
pIq
i,s be Pr

ei,t   P pIqt , @t P LpIqi , s.t., ui,t ¡ ui,s; ei,s ¥ P pIqs
	
for s P SpIq0 . Since s P S0
and L
pIq
i is ex ante optimal for i in F
pIq, σpIq, it implies:
¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as

L
pIq
i , ei;σ
pIqpθiq, ei
	
dGpθiq  C
LpIqi 	
¥
¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as
 
L, ei;σ
pIqpθiq, ei

dGpθiq  C
LpIqi   1	
where L ranks all schools in L
pIq
i and s while respecting their true preference rankings,
i.e., adding s to the true partial preference order L
pIq
i while keeping the new list a true
partial preference order.
For notational convenience, we relabel the schools such that school k is the kth choice
in L and that s is kth school in L. Those not ranked in L are labeled as |LpIqi | 2,    , S.
It then follows that:
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
¥
k1¸
t1
0 BpIqi,s ui,s
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 
|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
ui,t 
 Prei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , t 1	
Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	
,

k1¸
t1
0 BpIqi,s ui,s

|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
ui,t  Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,s ¥ P pIqs ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	
,
where the zeros in the first term on the right come from the upper invariance of DA. That
is, the admission probability at any school ranked above s is the same when i submits
either L
pIq
i or L.
Also note that ui,s ¡ ui,t for all t ¥ k   1 and that:
|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,s ¥ P pIqs ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	
¤ BpIqi,s .
Besides, ui,k 1 ¥ ui,t for all t  k   2,    , |Li|   1. Therefore, for all s P SpIq0 ,
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	 ¥ BpIqi,s ui,s BpIqi,s ui,k 1
This leads to:
B
pIq
i,s ¤
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
ui,s  ui,k 1 ¤
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
ui,s
.
Finally, B
pIq
i ¤
°
sPSpIq0
B
pIq
i,s ¤ |SzLi|Cp|Li| 1qCp|Li|qmax
sPSzLpIq
i
ui,s
. 
A.2.3 Asymptotic Distribution of Cutoffs and Convergence Rates
For the next result, we define the demand for each school in pE, σq as a function of the
cutoffs:
DspP | E, σq 
»
1pui,s  max
s1PSpei,P q

σpθiq
ui,s1qdGpθiq,
where σpθiq also denotes the set of schools ranked by i; 1pq is an indicator function. Let
DpP | E, σq  rDspP | E, σqssPS .
Assumption A1.
(i) There exists n P N such that σpIq  σ8 for all I ¡ n;
(ii) Dp | E, σ8q is C1 and BDpP8 | E, σ8q is invertible;
(iii)
°S
s1 qs   1.
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Part (i) says that σ8 maintains as an equilibrium strategy in any economy of a size
that is above a threshold. This is supported partially by the discussion in Section A.2.4.
In particular, when Cp2q ¡ 0, part (i) is satisfied. Dp | E, σ8q being C1 (in part ii) holds
when G admits a continuous density. In this case, the fraction of students whose demand
is affected by changes in P is continuous. Part (iii) guarantees that every school has a
positive cutoff in the stable matching of E.
Because of Assumption A1, our setting with cardinal preferences can be transformed
into one defined by students’ ROLs that is identical to that in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).
Therefore, some of their results are also satisfied in our setting.
Proposition A2. In a sequence of matchings, tµpIquIPN, of the sequence of random
economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, satisfying Assumption A1, we have
the following results:
(i) The distribution of cutoffs in pF pIq, σpIqq satisfies:
?
I
 
P pIq  P8 dÝÑ Np0, V pσ8qq
where V pσ8q  BDpP8 | E, σ8q1Σ pBDpP8 | E, σ8q1q1, and
Σ 

q1p1 q1q q1q2    q1qS
q2q1 q2p1 q2q    ...
...
...
. . . qS1qS
qSq1    qSqS1 qSp1 qSq
.
(ii) For any η ¡ 0 and I ¡ n, there exist constants γ1 and γ2 such that the probability
that the matching µpIq has cutoffs ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η is bounded by γ1eγ2I :
Pr
 ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η   γ1eγ2I .
(iii) Moreover, suppose that G admits a continuous density. For any η ¡ 0 and I ¡ n,
there exist constants γ11 and γ
1
2 such that, in matching µ
pIq, the probability of the fraction
of students who can form a blocking pair being greater than η is bounded by γ11e
γ12I :
Pr

GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq ¡ η

  γ11eγ
1
2I .
Parts (i) and (ii) are from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) (Proposition G1 and part 2 of
Proposition 3), although our part (iii) is new and extends their part 3 of Proposition 3.
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Proposition A2 describes convergence rates and thus has implications for empirical ap-
proaches based on stability (see Section 2.3).
Proof of Proposition A2 (part iii).
To show part (iii), we use similar techniques as in the proof for Proposition 3 (part 3)
in Azevedo and Leshno (2016). We first derive the following results.
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s R rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, @s P S;µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,su
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P S;µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
¤GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiqu
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq
In the first equality, whenever ei,s R rminpP8s , P pImqs q,maxpP8s , P pImqs qs, @s P S, i faces the
same set of feasible schools given either P pIq or P8, Spei, P pIqq  Spei, P8q. Because µ8
is stable, µ8pθiq is i’s favorite school in Spei, P8q; together with the relaxation of the
conditions in the second term, it leads to the inequality.
By Azevedo and Leshno (2016) Proposition 3 (part 3), we can find γ11 and γ
1
2 such
that:
Pr
 
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ η{2
  γ11eγ12I{2. (A.3)
Let g be the supremum of the marginal probability density of ei,s across all s. Denote
the set of student types with priority indices which have at least one coordinate close to
P8 by distance η1{p2Sgq (where η1  η{4):
Θη1  tθi P Θ | Ds P S, |ei,s  P8s | ¤ η1{p2Sgqu.
Then GpΘη1q ¤ 2Sg  η1{p2Sgq  η1. The fraction of students in F pIq that have types in
Θη1 is then G
pIqpΘη1q. Note that GpIqpΘη1q is a random variable with mean GpΘη1q. By
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the Vapnik-Chervonenkis Theorem,A.2
PrpGpIqpΘη1q ¡ 2η1q   Prp|GpIqpΘη1q GpΘη1q| ¡ η1q   γ11eγ
1
2I{4. (A.4)
Moreover, by part (ii), we know that:
Pr
 ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq   γ11eγ12I{4. (A.5)
We can choose γ11 and γ
1
2 appropriately, so that (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5) are all satisfied.
When the event, ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq, does not happen,
tθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Su  Θη1 .
When neither ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq nor GpIqpΘη1q ¡ 2η1 happens,
GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq ¤ 2η1  η{2;
the probability that neither of these two events happens is at least 1  γ11eγ12I{4 
γ11e
γ12I{4  1 γ11eγ12I{2. This implies,
PrpGpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq ¡ η{2q   γ11eγ
1
2I{2.
(A.6)
The events in (A.3) and (A.6) do not happen with probability at least 1γ11eγ12I{2
γ11e
γ12I{2  1 γ11eγ12I ; and when they do not happen,
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
¤GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiqu
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq
¤η.
Therefore,
Pr

GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq ¡ η

  γ11eγ
1
2I .

A.2See Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and the references therein for more details on the theorem for its
application in our context.
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A.2.4 Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Large Economies
We now discuss the properties of Bayesian Nash equilibria in a sequence of random
economies and thus provide some justifications to Assumptions 2 and A1.
We start with Lemma A2 showing that a strategy, which does not result in the stable
matching in the continuum economy when being adopted by students in the continuum
economy, cannot survive as an equilibrium strategy in sufficiently large economies. This
immediately implies that, in finite large economies, every student always includes in her
ROL the matched school in the continuum-economy stable matching (Lemma A3). More-
over, students do not pay a cost to rank more schools in large economies (Lemma A4).
Lastly, when it is costly to rank more than one school (Cp2q ¡ 0), in sufficiently large
economies, it is an equilibrium strategy for every students to only rank the matched
school prescribed by the continuum-economy stable matching.
Lemma A2. If a strategy σ results in a matching µpE,σq in the continuum economy such
that Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ 0, then there must exist n P N such that σ is not
an equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A2.
Suppose instead that there is a subsequence of finite random economies tF pInqunPN
such that σ is always an equilibrium. Note that we still have F pInq Ñ E almost surely,
and therefore tF pInq, σu converges to tE, σu almost surely.
Given the student-proposing DA, we focus on the student-optimal stable matching
(SOSM) in pF pIq, σq. By Proposition 3 of Azevedo and Leshno (2016), it must be that
P pInqÑP σ almost surely, where P pInq  P pµpF pInq,σqq and P σ  P pµpE,σqq.
Because there is a unique equilibrium outcome in E, which is also the unique stable
matching in E by assumption, Gptθi P Θi | µpE,σqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 in the continuum
economy implies that P σ is not the cutoffs of µ8 (E’s stable matching), P σ  P8.
Because there is a unique stable matching in E by assumption, µpE,σ8q is not stable
and thus is not an equilibrium outcome in E. There exist some η, ξ ¡ 0, such that:
Θpη,ξq 
$''''''&''''''%
θi P Θ

ei,µ8pθiq  P8µ8pθiq ¡ η,
ei,µpE,σqpθiq  P σµpE,σqpθiq ¡ η,
ei,s  P σs   η, for all s ranked above µpE,σqpθiq by σpθiq;
ui,µ8pθiq  ui,µpE,σqpθiq ¡ ξ.
,//////.//////-
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Θpη,ξq must have a positive measure for some η, ξ ¡ 0 and is a subset of students who
can form a blocking pair in µpE,σq. Clearly, σpθiq ranks µpE,σqpθiq but not µ8pθiq for all
θi P Θpη,ξq.
We show below that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in sufficiently large economies.
Consider a unilateral deviation for θi P Θpη,ξq from σpθiq to Li such that the only difference
between the two actions is that µpE,σqpθiq, ranked in σpθiq, is replaced by µ8pθiq in Li
while Li is kept as a partial order of i’s true preferences.
Because P pInqÑP σ almost surely, for 0   φ   ξ{p1  ξq there exists n1 P N such that,
in all F pInq with In ¡ n1, i is matched with µpE,σqpθiq with probability at least p1  φq
if submitting σpθiq, but would have been matched with µ8pθiq if instead Li had been
submitted.
Let EUpσpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpθiq. Then EUpσpθiqq ¤
p1φqui,µpE,σqpθiq φ, because maxstui,su ¤ 1 by assumption, and EUpLiq ¥ p1φqui,µ8pθiq.
The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpθiqq ¥p1 φqui,µ8pθiq  p1 φqui,µpE,σqpθiq  φ
¥p1 φqξ  φ ¡ 0,
implying that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in F pInq for In ¡ n1. This contradiction
further implies that there exist n P N such that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in all
F pIq with I ¡ n. 
Lemma A3. If a strategy σ is such that Gptθi P Θ | σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiquq ¡ 0,
then there must exist n P N such that σ is not an equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A3.
Note thatGptθi P Θ | σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 impliesGptθi P Θ | µpE,σqpθiq 
µ8pθiquq ¡ 0, because i cannot be matched with µ8pθiq if σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiq.
Lemma A2 therefore implies the statement in this lemma. 
Lemmata A2 and A3 imply that, in large enough economies, there exist equilibrium
strategies with which every student ranks her matched school prescribed by µ8. The
following lemma further bounds the number of choices that a student ranks.
Lemma A4. Suppose CpKq  0 and CpK   1q ¡ 0 for 1 ¤ K ¤ pS  1q. Consider a
strategy σ such that σpθiq ranks at least K   1 schools for all θi P Θ1  Θ and GpΘ1q ¡ 0.
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In the sequence of random economies, tF pIquIPN, there exists n P N such that σ is not an
equilibrium strategy in any economy F pIq for I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A4.
By Lemma A3, we only need to consider all σ that rank µ8pθiq for θi. Otherwise, the
statement is satisfied already.
Let CpK   1q  ξ. By Proposition 3 of Azevedo and Leshno (2016), it must be
that P pIqÑP σ almost surely in the sequence tF pIq, σuIPN, where P pIq  P pµpF pIq,σqq and
P σ  P pµpE,σqq. For 0   φ   2ξ, there must exit n P N such that i is matched with
µ8pθiq with probability at least 1 φ in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Let EUpσpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpθiq. We compare this strat-
egy with any unilateral deviation Li that keeps ranking µ
8pθiq but drops one of the other
ranked schools in σpθiq.
Then EUpσpθiqq ¤ p1φqui,µ8pθiq φ ξ, where the right side assumes that i obtains
the highest possible utility (equal to one) whenever not being matched with µ8pθiq.
Moreover, EUpLiq ¥ p1 φqui,µ8pθiq   ξ. The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpθiqq ¥ 2ξ  φ ¡ 0,
which proves that σ is an equilibrium strategy in F pIq for I ¡ n. 
Moreover, when Cp2q ¡ 0, we can obtain even sharper results:
Lemma A5. Suppose Cp2q ¡ 0 (i.e., it is costly to rank more than one school), and
σpθiq  pµ8pθiqq (i.e., only ranking the school prescribed by µ8) for all student types. In
a sequence of random economies tF pIquIPN, there exists n P N such that σ is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A5. This is implied by Lemmata A3 and A4 (when K  1). 
A.2.5 Equilibrium and Stable Matching
In a finite economy with complete information, it is known that a matching in equilibrium
can be unstable (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). They further show that, in finite economies,
DA with constraints implements stable matchings in Nash equilibria if and only if the
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student priority indices at all schools satisfy the so-called Ergin acyclicity condition (Er-
gin, 2002). We extend this result to the continuum economy and to a more general class
of DA mechanisms where application costs, Cp|L|q, are flexible.
Definition A1. In a continuum economy, we fix a vector of capacities, tqsuSs1, and
a distribution of priority indices, H. An Ergin cycle is constituted of distinct schools
ps1, s2q and subsets of students tΘ1,Θ2,Θ3u (of equal measure q0 ¡ 0 ), whose elements
are denoted by θ1, θ2, and θ3, respectively, and whose “identities” are i1, i2, and i3, such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Cycle condition: ei1,s1 ¡ ei2,s1 ¡ ei3,s1, and ei3,s2 ¡ ei1,s2, for all i1, i2, and i3.
(ii) Scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets of agents Θs1, Θs2 P
Θz tΘ1,Θ2,Θ3u such that ei,s1 ¡ ei2,s1 for all θi P Θs1, |Θs1 |  qs1  q0; ei,s2 ¡ ei1,s2 for
all i P Θs1, and |Θs2 |  qs2  q0.
A priority index distribution H is Ergin-acyclic if it allows no Ergin cycles.
This acyclicity condition is satisfied if all schools rank students in the same way. With
this, we extend Theorem 6.3 in Haeringer and Klijn (2009) to the continuum economy.
Proposition A3. In the continuum economy E:
(i) If Cp2q  0, every (pure-strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium results in a stable
matching if and only if the economy satisfies Ergin-acyclicity (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
(ii) If Cp2q ¡ 0, all (pure-strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable.
Proof. To prove parts (i) and (ii), we use the proof of Theorem 6.3 in Haeringer and Klijn
(2009) and, therefore, that of Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002). They can be directly extended
to the continuum economy under more general DA mechanisms. We notice the following:
(a) The continuum economy can be “discretized” such that each subset of students can
be treated as a single student. When doing so, we do not impose restrictions on
the sizes of the subsets, as long as they have a positive measure. This allows us to
use the derivations in the aforementioned proofs.
(b) The flexibility in the cost function of ranking more schools does not impose addi-
tional restrictions. As we focus on equilibrium, for any strategy with more than
one school listed, we can find a one-school list that has the same or higher payoff.
Indeed, many steps in the aforementioned proofs involve such a trick.

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A.3 Consistency of the Preference Estimator under the As-
sumption of Asymptotic Stability
We provide a proof of the consistency of MLE under the assumption of asymptotic sta-
bility. The same proof can be extended to the corresponding GMM estimator.
Let us consider a sequence of random economies and strategies that satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2. The associated matchings and cutoffs are tµpIq, P pIquIPN. We further assume
that limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8, almost surely, and that tµpIquIPN is asymptotically stable.A.3
In this section, we follow the notation in Newey and McFadden (1994) and define:
Q0pβ|P8q  EtZ,eu

ln

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β
ff
,
where the expectation is taken over Zi, ei. Recall that both µ
8 and P8 are deterministic.
We also define the following regularity conditions.
Assumption A2. Suppose that the data are i.i.d., that β0 is the true parameter value,
and that the sequence tµpIq, P pIquIPN has limIÑ8 P pIq  P8, almost surely, and tµpIquIPN
being asymptotically stable. We impose the following regularity conditions:
(i) Q0pβ|P8q is continuous in β and uniquely maximized at β0.
(ii) β P B, which is compact.
(iii) At any β P B for almost all Zi and ei, Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β

is bounded away from zero and continuous.
(iv) EtZ,eu

sup
βPB
ln

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β
ff

  8.
(v) GpΘδqEpZ,eq
 sup
βPB,sPS,PPPpei,sq
ln
Pr

s arg max
sPSpei,P q
ui,s|Zi,ei,Spei,P q;β

Pr

µ8pui,eiq arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s|Zi,ei,Spei,P8q;β

 | pui, eiq P Θδ

converges to zero as δ Ñ 0, where Θδ  tpui, eiq P Θ : ei,s P pP8s δ, P8s  δq, Ds P Su
for δ ¡ 0 and Ppei, sq  tP P r0, 1sS : s P Spei, P qu is the set of all possible cutoffs
making s feasible to i.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard for identification of the model; conditions (iii)
A.3Recall that under the stability assumption, only students who have at least two feasible schools
contribute to the estimation. If one has zero or one feasible school, her match (or her choice) does not
reveal any information about her preferences. To simplify the notations below, we implicitly assume that
a student’s probability of being matched with the school prescribed by the match in a finite economy or
the continuum economy is one, whenever she has no feasible school.
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and (iv) are satisfied in common applications of discrete choice models, including logit
and probit models with or without random coefficients.
Condition (v) extends condition (iv). Without loss in our setting, we assume G admits
a marginal density of ei, and thus GpΘδq Ñ 0 as δ Ñ 0. Condition (v) is then satisfied if
the conditional expectation in (v) is either bounded or grows to infinity at a slower rate
than 1{GpΘδq when δ Ñ 0. This is satisfied in the aforementioned discrete choice models
that have full-support utility shocks, as choice probabilities are bounded away from zero
almost surely given that β P B.A.4
To proceed, we define pQIpβ|P pIqq as the average of log-likelihood based on stability
when the economy is of size I. That is,
pQIpβ|P pIqq  1
I
I¸
i1
S¸
s1
1pµpIqpui, eiq  sq ln

Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P pIqq
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P pIqq; β
ff
.
pQIpβ|P pIqq is possibly incorrectly specified because µpIq may not be exactly stable. That
is, some students may not be matched with their favorite feasible school in µpIq.
Correspondingly, we also define:
pQIpβ|P8q  1
I
I¸
i1
ln

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β
ff
.
In this definition, with the same economy as used in pQIpβ|P pIqq, we construct the hy-
pothetical matching µ8 and cutoff P8. Recall that both µ8 and P8 are deterministic.pQIpβ|P8q is then the average of the log-likelihood function of this hypothetical dataset.pQIpβ|P8q is correctly specified because in matching µ8, every student is matched with
her favorite feasible school given P8.
The following lemma shows that the MLE estimator would be consistent if we could
have access to the hypothetical dataset and use pQIpβ|P8q.
Lemma A6. When conditions (i)-(iv) in Assumption A2 are satisfied,
(i) supβPB | pQIpβ|P8q Q0pβ|P8q| pÑ 0, and
(ii) β˜I is consistent (i.e., β˜I
pÑ β0), where β˜I  arg maxβPB pQIpβ|P8q.
A.4Equivalently, this requires that a choice probability is strictly positive for almost all Z. This is also
true in the usual models with random coefficients; random coefficients often have full support on the real
line and therefore lead to strictly positive choice probabilities.
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Proof. Note thatln

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β
ff
¤ sup
βPB
ln

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q; β
ff .
Implied by condition (iv) of Assumption A2, the right-hand-side of the inequality has a
finite first moment. Together with conditions (ii) and (iii), this implies that the conditions
in Lemma 2.4 of Newey and McFadden (1994) are satisfied, leading to part (i) of the above
lemma. By Theorem 2.1 of Newey and McFadden (1994), part (ii) is also satisfied. 
Lemma A7. Given Assumption A2, supβPB | pQIpβ|P pIqq  pQIpβ|P8q| pÑ 0.
Proof. Lemma A3 shows that in sufficiently large economies, every student except a
measure-zero set includes in her ROL the school prescribed by µ8. For each student,
whenever Spei, P pIqq  Spei, P8q, µpIqpui, eiq  µ8pui, eiq.
Therefore, for any β P B, in sufficiently large economies,
 pQIpβ|P pIqq  pQIpβ|P8q


1
I
¸
i:Spei,P pIqqSpei,P8q
S¸
s1
1pµpIqpui, eiq  sq ln
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P pIqq
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P pIqq;β

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q;β


¤
1
I
¸
i:Spei,P pIqqSpei,P8q
S¸
s1
1pµpIqpui, eiq  sq

ln
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P pIqq
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P pIqq;β

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q;β


¤
1
I
¸
i:Spei,P pIqqSpei,P8q
sup
βPB,sPS,PPPpei,sq

ln
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P q
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P q;β

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q;β


¤
1
I
¸
pui,eiqPΘδ
sup
βPB,sPS,PPPpei,sq

ln
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P q
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P q;β

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q;β

loooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
pq
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 
1
I
¸
pui,eiqPΘzΘδ:
Spei,P pIqqSpei,P8q
sup
βPB,sPS,PPPpei,sq

ln
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P q
ui,s1 | Zi, ei,Spei, P q;β

Pr

µ8pui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P8q;β

looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
pq
(A.7)
Since the above results apply to all β P B, inequality (A.7) is also satisfied if we replace
the first line with supβPB
 pQIpβ|P pIqq  pQIpβ|P8q.
By the law of large numbers, as I Ñ 8, () in inequality (A.7) converges almost
surely to GpΘδqEpZ,eq
 sup
βPB,sPS,
PPPpei,sq
ln
Pr

s arg max
s1PSpei,P pIqq
ui,s1 |Zi,ei,Spei,P pIqq;β


Pr

µ8pui,eiq arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s|Zi,ei,Spei,P8q;β

 | pui, eiq P Θδ
,
which, as a function of δ, converges to zero if δ Ñ 0 (condition v of Assumption A2).
This implies that, for η1 ¡ 0, there exists δη1 such that for all δ   δη1 , we have
GpΘδqEpZ,eq
 sup
βPB,sPS,
PPPpei,sq
ln
Pr

s arg max
s1PSpei,P pIqq
ui,s1 |Zi,ei,Spei,P pIqq;β


Pr

µ8pui,eiq arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s|Zi,ei,Spei,P8q;β

 | pui, eiq P Θδ
  η1{2. By
inequality (A.7) and the law of large numbers, we can choose n1 such that for any I ¡ n1,
supβPB
 pQIpβ|P pIqq  pQIpβ|P8q   η1{2  η1{2 pq|δ δη1  η1  pq|δ δη1 almost surely,
where pq|δ δη1 indicates the last term in inequality (A.7) evaluated at δ   δη1 .
Moreover, by assumption, limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8, almost surely. Given δ   δη1 and for
any η2, there exists n2 such that for I ¡ n2, Pr
 P pIq  P8 ¤ δ ¡ 1  η2. When this
happens (i.e.,
P pIq  P8 ¤ δ), pq in inequality (A.7) evaluated at δ is zero because
tpui, eiq P ΘzΘδ : Spei, P pIqq  Spei, P8qu is empty.
Therefore, for any η1 and η2, there exist n1 and n2 such that whenever I ¡ maxtn1, n2u,
Pr

supβPB
 pQIpβ|P pIqq  pQIpβ|P8q ¡ η1	   η2, which proves the lemma. 
Proposition A4. When Assumption A2 is satisfied, pβI is consistent (i.e., pβI pÑ β0),
where pβI  arg maxβPB pQIpβ|P pIqq.
Proof. Assumption A2, Lemma A6 (part i), and Lemma A7 imply that pQIpβ|P pIqq satis-
fies the conditions in Theorem 2.1 of Newey and McFadden (1994). Hence, pβI pÑ β0. 
A.4 Estimation with Strict Truth-Telling and Outside Option
The following discussion supplements Section 2.2 in which we present how weak truth-
telling (WTT) can be applied to data on school choice and college admissions and what
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assumptions it entails. However, assuming the length of submitted ROL is exogenous
(Assumption WTT2) may seem restrictive. An alternative way to relax this assumption
is to introduce an outside option and to make some school unacceptable to some students.
Suppose that i’s utility for her outside option is denoted by ui,0  Vi,0   i,0, where
i,0 is a type I extreme value. We then augment the type space of each student with the
outside option and let σS : RpS 1q  r0, 1sS Ñ L be an STT pure strategy defined on the
augmented preference space. More precisely, one version of the STT assumption contains
the following two assumptions:
Assumption (Strict Truth-Telling with Outside Option).
STT1. σSpui, ui,0, eiq ranks all i’s acceptable schools according to her true preferences.
STT2. Students do not rank unacceptable schools: ui,0 ¡ ui,s1 for all s1 not ranked by
σSpui, ui,0, eiq.
Given these two assumptions, similar to the case with WTT, either MLE or GMM
can be applied based on the following choice probabilities:A.5
Pr
 
σSpui, ui,0, eiq  L
 Zi; β Pr  ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,0 ¡ ui,s1 @ s1 P SzL  Zi; β
 exppVi,0q
exppVi,0q  
°
s1RL exppVi,s1q
¹
sPL

exppVi,sq
exppVi,0q  
°
s1£Ls
exppVi,s1q

.
Recall that s1 £L s indicates that s
1 is not ranked before s in L, which includes s itself
and the schools not ranked in L.
Assumptions STT1 and STT2 can be justified as an equilibrium outcome when there
is no application cost. However, there may be an issue of multiple equilibria created by
unacceptable schools. Namely, if a student can always decline to enroll at an unacceptable
school, she may not mind including or excluding that school in her ROL and being
assigned to it (He, 2015).
A.5 Assumption EXO2 for the Stability-Based Estimator
The necessity of Assumption EXO2 can be seen in a following modified utility function:
ui,s  ui,s 8 1pei,s   Pspµqq  V pZi,s, βq  8  1pei,s   Pspµqq   i,s,
A.5For an example imposing the STT assumption, see He and Magnac (2016) in which the authors
observe students ranking all available options and have information on the acceptability of each option.
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where 8  1ptei,s   Pspµqq is zero for feasible schools but equal to 8 for infeasible
ones, thus making them always less desirable. With 1pei,s   Pspµqq being personalized
“prices,” a stable matching is then equivalent to discrete choice based on the modified
utility functions (He et al., 2015, 2018). That is, a realized matching µˆ is stable if and
only if µˆpθiq  µˆpui, eiq  arg maxsPS ui,s. Although utility shocks can depend on Zi for
identification in usual discrete choice models (Matzkin, 1993), 1pei,s   Pspµqq is special.
Conditional on 1pei,s   Pspµqq and Zi, i’s ordinal preferences and thus i’s choice may lack
variation without Assumption EXO2. This is shown in the following example.
An example with Assumption EXO2 violated. Let I  3 and S  3, each with one
seat. Students have the same preferences, pui,1, ui,2, ui,3q  p0.9, 0.6, 0.3q for i P t1, 2, 3u;
the priority index vectors pei,1, ei,2, ei,3q are p0.8, 0.5, 0.8q for i  1, p0.5, 0.8, 0.3q for i  2,
and p0.3, 0.3, 0.5q for i  3.
Suppose students are strictly truth-telling. Therefore, the matching is stable. The cut-
offs are P  p0.8, 0.8, 0.5q, which leads to Spe1, P q  t1, 3u. However, if pui,1, ui,2, ui,3q 
p0.6, 0.9, 0.3q for i  1, then P 1  p0.5, 0.5, 0.5q and Spe1, P 1q  t1, 2, 3u. Therefore,
for i  1, Spei, P pµqqMi|Zi. If the data generating process is as such, conditional on
student 1’s set of feasible schools, we never observe u1,1 ¡ u1,2, or school 1 being chosen
over school 2 when both are feasible.
An example with Assumption EXO2 satisfied. Let us consider the following ex-
ample with Ergin cyclicity where each school has one seat.
School priority ranking (high to low) Student ordinal preferences (more to less preferred)
s1: i1, i3, i2 i1: s2, s1, s3
s2: i2, i1, i3 i2: s1, s2, s3
s3: i2, i1, i3 i3: s1, s2, s3
When everyone is strictly truth-telling, i1’s set feasible schools Spei1 , P q  ts1, s3u.
No matter how i1’s ordinal preferences change, i1’s feasible schools do not change, as long
as the matching is stable.A.6 Therefore, given others’ preferences, Assumption EXO2 is
satisfied for i1.
A.6In any stable matching, i2 is assigned to s2; otherwise, either i3 or i2 would have justified envy.
Therefore, s2 is not feasible to i1. Both s1 and s3 are feasible to i1 in any stable matching, because i1
has a higher priority at both schools than i3, while i2’s assignment is fixed at s2.
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Appendix B Data
B.1 Data Sources
For the empirical analysis, we use three administrative data sets on Parisian students,
which are linked using an encrypted version of the French national student identifer
(Identifiant National E´le`ve).
(i) Application Data: The first data set was provided to us by the Paris Education
Authority (Rectorat de Paris) and contains all the information necessary to replicate
the assignment of students to public academic-track high schools in the city of Paris
for the 2013-2014 academic year. This includes the schools’ capacities, the students’
ROLs of schools, and their priority indices at every school. Moreover, it contains
information on students’ socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, parents’
SES, low-income status, etc.), and their home addresses, allowing us to compute
distances to each school in the district.
(ii) Enrollment Data: The second data set is a comprehensive register of students
enrolled in Paris’ middle and high schools during the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014
academic years (Base Ele`ves Acade´mique), which is also from the Paris Education
Authority. This data set allows to track students’ enrollment status in all Parisian
public and private middle and high schools.
(iii) Exam Data: The third data set contains all Parisian middle school students’
individual examination results for a national diploma, the Diploˆme national du
brevet (DNB), which students take at the end of middle school. We obtained this
data set from the statistical office of the French Ministry of Education (Direction
de l’E´valuation, de la Prospective et de la Performance du Ministe`re de l’E´ducation
Nationale).
B.2 Definition of Variables
Priority Indices. Students’ priority indices at every school are recorded as the sum of
three main components: (i) students receive a “district” bonus of 600 points on each of
the schools in their list which are located in their home district; (ii) students’ academic
performance during the last year of middle school is graded on a scale of 400 to 600
points; (iii) students from low-income families are awarded an additional bonus of 300
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points. We convert these priority indices into percentiles between 0 and 1.
Student Scores. Based on the DNB exam data set, we compute several measures
of student academic performance, which are normalized as percentiles between 0 and 1
among all Parisian students who took the exam in the same year. Both French and math
scores are used, and we also construct the students’ composite score, which is the average
of the French and math scores. Note that students’ DNB scores are different from the
academic performance measure used to calculate student priority indices as an input into
the DA mechanism. Recall that the latter is based on the grades obtained by students
throughout their final year of middle school.
Socio-Economic Status. Students’ socio-economic status is based on their parents’
occupation. We use the French Ministry of Education’s official classification of occu-
pations to define “high SES”: if the occupation of the student’s legal guardian (usually
one of the parents) belongs to the “very high SES” category (company managers, exec-
utives, liberal professions, engineers, academic and art professions), the student is coded
as high SES, otherwise she is coded as low SES.A.7
B.3 Construction of the Main Data Set for Analyses
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the Southern District of Paris (District Sud).
We focus on public middle school students who are allowed to continue their studies in
the academic track of upper secondary education and whose official residence is in the
Southern District. We exclude those with disabilities, those who are repeating the first
year of high school, and those who were admitted to specific selective tracks offered by
certain public high schools in Paris (e.g., music majors, bilingual courses, etc.), as these
students are given absolute priority in the assignment over other students. This leads to
the exclusion of 350 students, or 18 percent of the total, the majority of whom are grade
repeaters. Our data thus include 1,590 students from 57 different public middle schools,
with 96 percent of students coming from one of the district’s 24 middle schools.
A.7There are four official categories: low SES, medium SES, high SES, and very high SES.
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Appendix C Monte Carlo Simulations
This appendix provides details on the Monte Carlo simulations that we perform to assess
our empirical approaches and model selection tests. Section C.1 specifies the model,
Section C.2 describes the data generating processes, Section C.3 reports a number of
summary statistics for the simulated data, and Section C.4 discusses the main results.
C.1 Model Specification
Economy Size. We consider an economy where I  500 students compete for admis-
sion to S  6 schools. The vector of school capacities is specified as follows:
I  tqsu6s1  t50, 50, 25, 50, 150, 150u.
Setting the total capacity of schools (475 seats) to be strictly smaller than the number of
students (500) simplifies the analysis by ensuring that each school has a strictly positive
cutoff in equilibrium.
Spatial Configuration. The school district is stylized as a disc of radius 1 (Figure C1).
The schools (represented by red circles) are evenly located on a circle of radius 1{2 around
the district centroid; the students (represented by blue circles) are uniformly distributed
across the district area. The cartesian distance between student i and school s is denoted
by di,s.
Student Preferences. To represent student preferences over schools, we adopt a par-
simonious version of the random utility model described in Section 2.1. Student i’s utility
from attending school s is specified as follows:
ui,s  10  αs  di,s   γpai  a¯sq   i,s, s  1, . . . , 6; (A.8)
where 10   αs is school s’s fixed effects; di,s is the walking distance from student i’s
residence to school s; ai is student i’s ability; a¯s is school s’s quality; and i,s is an error
term that is drawn from a type-I extreme value distribution. Setting the effect of distance
to 1 ensures that other coefficients can be interpreted in terms of willingness to travel.
The school fixed effects above the common factor, 10, are specified as follows:
tαsu6s1  t0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5u
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Figure C1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Spatial Distribution of Students and Schools
Notes: This figure shows the spatial configuration of the school district considered in one of the Monte Carlo samples, for
the case with 500 students and 6 schools. The school district is represented as a disc of radius 1. The small blue and large
red circles show the location of students and of schools, respectively.
Adding the common value of 10 for every school ensures that all schools are acceptable
in the simulated samples.
Students’ abilities taiuIi1 are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on the in-
terval r0, 1s. School qualities ta¯suSs1 are exogenous to students’ idiosyncratic preferences
i,s. The procedure followed to ascribe values to the schools’ qualities is discussed at the
end of this section.
The positive coefficient γ on the interaction term ai  a¯s reflects the assumption that
high-ability students value school quality more than low-ability students. In the simula-
tions, we set γ  3.
Priority Indices. Students are ranked separately by each school based on a school-
specific index ei,s. The vector of student priority indices at a given school s, tei,suIi1
is constructed as correlated random draws with marginal uniform distributions on the
interval [0,1], such that: (i) student i’s index at each school is correlated with her ability
ai with a correlation coefficient of ρ; (ii) i’s indices at any two schools s1 and s2 are
also correlated with correlation coefficient ρ. When ρ is set equal to 1, a student has
the same priority at all schools. When ρ is set equal to zero, her priority indices at the
different schools are uncorrelated. For the simulations presented in this appendix, we
choose ρ  0.7. It is assumed that student know their priority indices but not their
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priority ranking at each school.
School Quality. To ensure that school qualities ta¯suSs1 are exogenous to students’
idiosyncratic preferences, while being close to those observed in Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of the school choice game, we adopt the following procedure: we consider the un-
constrained student-proposing DA where students rank all schools truthfully; students’
preferences are constructed using random draws of errors and a common prior about the
average quality of each school; students rank schools truthfully and are assigned through
the DA mechanism; each school’s quality is computed as the average ability of students
assigned to that school; a fixed-point vector of school qualities, denoted by ta¯suSs1, is
found; the value of each school’s quality is set equal to mean value of a¯s across the
samples.
The resulting vector of school qualities is:
ta¯su6s1  t0.28, 0.39, 0.68, 0.65, 0.47, 0.61u
C.2 Data Generating Processes
The simulated data are constructed under two distinct data generating processes (DGPs).
DGP 1: Constrained/Truncated DA. This DGP considers a situation where the
student-proposing DA is used to assign students to schools but where the number of
schools that students are allowed to rank, K, is strictly smaller than the total number of
available schools, S. For expositional simplicity, students are assumed to incur no cost
when ranking exactly K schools. Hence:
C p|L|q 
$&% 0 if |L| ¤ K 8 if |L| ¡ K
In the simulations, we set K  4 (students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools out of 6).
DGP 2: Unconstrained DA with Cost. This DGP considers the case where stu-
dents are not formally constrained in the number of schools they can rank but nevertheless
incur a constant marginal cost, denoted by cp¡ 0q, each time they increase the length of
their ROL by one, if this list contains more than one school. Hence:
C p|L|q  c  p|L|  1q ,
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where the marginal cost c is strictly positive. In the simulations, we set c  106.
For each DGP, we adopt a two-stage procedure to solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the school choice game.
Stage 1: Distribution of Cutoffs Under Unconstrained DA. Students’ “initial”
beliefs about the distribution of school cutoffs are based on the distribution of cutoffs that
arises when students submit unrestricted truthful rankings of schools under the standard
DA. Specifically:
(i) For m  1,    ,M , we independently generate sample m by drawing students’
geographic coordinates, ability a
pmq
i , school-specific priority indices e
pmq
i,s , and id-
iosyncratic preferences 
pmq
i,s over the S schools for all I students. We then calculate
u
pmq
i,s for all i  1,    , I, s  1,    , S, and m  1,    ,M .
(ii) Student i in sample m submits a complete and truthful ranking rpupmqi q of the
schools; i.e., i is strictly truth-telling.
(iii) After collecting trpupmqi quIi1, the DA mechanism assigns students to schools taking
into account their priority indices in sample m.
(iv) Each matching µpmq in samplem determines a vector of school cutoffs P pmq  tP pmqs uSs1.
(v) The cutoffs tP pmquMm1 are used to derive the empirical distribution of school cutoffs
under the unconstrained DA, which is denoted by Fˆ 0p | tP pmquMm1q.
In the simulations, we set M  500.
Stage 2: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For each DGP, the M Monte Carlo samples
generated in Stage 1 are used to solve the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the school choice
game. Specifically:
(i) Each student i in each sample m determines all possible true partial preference
orders tLpmqi,n uNn1 over the schools, i.e., all potential ROLs of length between 1 and
K that respect i’s true preference ordering Ri,m of schools among those ranked in
L
pmq
i,n ; for each student, there are N 
°K
k1 S!{rk!pS  kq!s such partial orders.
Under the constrained/truncated DA (DGP 1), students consider only true partial
preference orderings of length K (  S), i.e., 15 candidate ROLs when they rank
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exactly 4 schools out of 6;A.8 under the unconstrained DA with cost (DGP 2),
students consider all true partial orders of length up to S, i.e., 63 candidate ROLs
when they can rank up to 6 schools.
(ii) For each candidate ROL L
pmq
i,n , student i estimates the (unconditional) probabilities
of being admitted to each school by comparing her indices ei,s to the distribution of
cutoffs. Initial beliefs on the cutoff distribution are based on Fˆ 0p | tP pmquMm1q, i.e.,
the empirical distribution of cutoffs under unconstrained DA with strictly truth-
telling students.
(iii) Each student selects the ROL L
pmq
i that maximizes her expected utility, where the
utilities of each school are weighted by the probabilities of admission according to
her beliefs.
(iv) After collecting tLpmqi uIi1, the DA mechanism is run in sample m.
(v) The matchings across the M samples jointly determine the “posterior” empirical
distribution of school cutoffs, Fˆ 1p | q.
(vi) Students use Fˆ 1p | q as their beliefs, and steps (ii) to (v) are repeated until a fixed
point is found, which occurs when the posterior distribution of cutoffs (Fˆ tp | q) is
consistent with students’ beliefs Fˆ t1p | q. The equilibrium beliefs are denoted by
Fˆ p | q.
The simulated school choice data are then constructed based on a new set of M Monte
Carlo samples, which are distinct from the samples used to find the equilibrium distribu-
tion of cutoffs. In each of these new Monte Carlo samples, submitted ROLs are students’
best response to the equilibrium distribution of cutoffs (Fˆ p | q). The school choice data
consist of students’ priority indices, their submitted ROLs, the student-school matching,
and the realized cutoffs in each sample.
C.3 Summary Statistics of Simulated Data
We now present some descriptive analysis on the equilibrium cutoff distributions and the
500 Monte Carlo samples of school choice data that are simulated for each DGP.
Equilibrium Distribution of Cutoffs. The equilibrium distribution of school cutoffs
is displayed in Figure C2 separately for each DGP. In line with the theoretical predictions
A.8This is without loss of generality, because in equilibrium the admission probability is non-degenerate
and it is, therefore, in students’ best interest to rank exactly 4 schools.
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(Proposition A2), the marginal distribution of cutoffs is approximately normal. Because
both DGPs involve the same profiles of preferences and produce almost identical match-
ings, the empirical distribution of cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA (left panel)
is very similar to that observed under the unconstrained DA with cost (right panel).
(a) Constrained/truncated DA
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(b) Unconstrained DA with cost
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Figure C2: Monte Carlo Simulations: Equilibrium Distribution of School Cutoffs
(6 schools, 500 students)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium marginal distribution of school cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA (left
panel) and the DA with cost (right panel) in a setting where 500 students compete for admission to 6 schools. With 500
simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command.
School cutoffs are not strictly aligned with the school fixed effects, since cutoffs are
also influenced by school size. In the simulations, small schools (e.g., Schools 3 and 4)
tend to have higher cutoffs than larger schools (e.g., Schools 5 and 6) because, in spite
of being less popular, they can be matched only with a small number of students, which
pushes their cutoffs upward.A.9
Figure C3 reports the marginal distribution of cutoffs in the constrained/truncated
DA for various economy sizes. The simulations show that as the number of seats and the
number of students increase proportionally while holding the number of schools constant,
the distribution of school cutoffs degenerates and becomes closer to a normal distribution.
Summary Statistics. Table C1 shows some descriptive statistics of the simulated data
from both DGPs. The reported means are averaged over the 500 Monte Carlo samples.
A.9Note that this phenomenon is also observed if one sets γ  0, i.e., when students’ preferences over
schools do not depend on the interaction term ai  a¯s.
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(a) 100 students
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(b) 200 students
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(c) 500 students
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(d) 5,000 students
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Figure C3: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of Economy Size on the Equilibrium
Distribution of Cutoffs (Constrained/Truncated DA)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium marginal distribution of school cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA
(ranking 4 out of 6 schools) when varying the number of students, I, who compete for admission into 6 schools with a total
enrollment capacity of I  0.95 seats. Using 500 simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal
bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command.
All students under the constrained/truncated DA submit ROLs of the maximum
allowed length (4 schools). Under the unconstrained DA with cost, students are allowed
to rank as many schools as they wish but, due to the cost of submitting longer lists, they
rank 4.6 schools on average.
Under both DGPs, all school seats are filled, and, therefore, 95 percent of students are
assigned to a school. Weak truth-telling is violated under the constrained/truncated DA,
since less than half of submitted ROLs rank truthfully students’ most-preferred schools.
Although less widespread, violations of WTT are still observed under the unconstrained
DA with cost, since about 20 percent of students do not truthfully rank their most-
preferred schools. By contrast, almost every student is matched with her favorite feasible
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school under both DGPs.
Table C1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Summary Statistics
Data generating process
Constrained/truncated DA Unconstrained DA with cost
(1) (2)
Panel A. Outcomes
Average length of submitted ROLs 4.00 4.60
(0.000) (0.054)
Assigned to a school 0.950 0.950
(0.000) (0.000)
Weakly truth-telling 0.391 0.792
(0.022) (0.018)
Assigned to favorite feasible school 1.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Panel B. Parameters
Number of students 500 500
Number of schools 6 6
Number of simulated samples 500 500
Maximum possible length of ROL 4 6
Marginal application cost (c) 0 106
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of simulated data under two DGPs: (i) constrained/truncated DA (column 1):
students are only allowed to rank 4 schools out of 6; and (ii) unconstrained DA with cost (column 2): students can rank as
many schools as they like, but incur a constant marginal cost of c  106 per extra school included in their ROL beyond
the first choice. Standard deviations across the 500 simulation samples are in parentheses.
Comparative Statics. To explore how the cost of ranking more schools affects weak
truth-telling and ex post stability in equilibrium, we simulated data for DGP 2 (DA with
cost) using different values of the cost parameter c, while keeping the other parameters
at their baseline values.A.10
For each value of the cost parameter, we simulated 500 samples of school choice data
and computed the following statistics by averaging across samples: (i) average length of
submitted ROLs; (ii) average fraction of weakly truth-telling students; and (iii) average
fraction of students assigned to their favorite feasible school.
The results of this comparative statics exercise are displayed in Figure C4. They
confirm that, in our simulations, stability is a weaker assumption than WTT whenever
students face a cost of ranking more schools: the share of students assigned to their
favorite feasible school (blue line) is always larger than the share of WTT students (red
A.10We performed a similar exercise for DGP 1 (constrained/truncated DA) by varying the number of
schools that students are allowed to rank. The results (available upon request) yield conclusions similar
to those based on DGP 2 (DA with cost).
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Figure C4: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of the Marginal Cost of Applying to
Schools on Equilibrium Outcomes (500 Students, 6 Schools)
Notes: This figure presents summary statistics of simulated data under unconstrained DA with cost (DGP 2), in which
students can rank as many schools as they like, but incur a constant marginal cost c per extra school included in their
ROL beyond the first. The data are simulated using different values of the marginal cost parameter c, while maintaining
the other parameters at their baseline values. For each value of the cost parameter, 500 samples of school choice data
are simulated. The following statistics are computed by averaging across samples: (i) average length of submitted ROLs;
(ii) average fraction of weakly truth-telling students; (iii) average fraction of students matched with favorite feasible school.
line). Consistent with the predictions from Section 1.4.2, the fraction of students who are
matched with their favorite feasible school decreases with the marginal cost of ranking
more schools (parameter c). In our simulations, violations of this assumption are very
rare, except in the extreme case where students face a large marginal application cost c
equal to 1 (in which case students rank only 1.3 school on average).
C.4 Results
Estimation and Testing. With the simulated data at hand, student preferences de-
scribed by Equation (A.8) are estimated under different sets of identifying assumptions:
(i) weak truth-telling; (ii) stability; and (iii) stability and undominated strategies. Es-
timates under assumption (i) are based on a rank-ordered logit model using maximum
likelihood. Estimates under assumption (ii) are obtained from a conditional logit model
where each student’s choice set is restricted to the ex post feasible schools and where the
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matched school is the chosen alternative.A.11 Finally, estimates under assumption (iii) are
based on Andrews and Shi (2013)’s method of moment (in)equalities, using the approach
proposed by Bugni et al. (2017) to construct the marginal confidence intervals for the
point estimates.A.12
The results from 500 Monte Carlo samples are reported and discussed in the main
text (Table 2). They are consistent with the theoretical predictions for both the con-
strained/truncated DA (Panel A) and the unconstrained DA with cost (Panel B).
Efficiency Loss from Stability-Based Estimates. The efficiency loss from estimat-
ing the model under stability is further explored by comparing the truth-telling-based
and stability-based estimates in a setting where students are strictly truth-telling. To
that end, we generate a new set of 500 Monte Carlo samples using the unconstrained DA
DGP, after setting the marginal application cost c to zero. In this setting, all students
submit truthful ROLs that rank all 6 schools. The estimation results, which are reported
in Table C2, show that while both truth-telling-based and stability-based estimates are
close to the true parameters values, the latter are much more imprecisely estimated than
the former (column 6 vs. column 3): the stability-based estimates have standard devi-
ations 2.5 to 3.8 times larger than the TT-based estimates. Note, however, that the
efficiency loss induced by the stability assumption is considerably reduced when combing
stability and undominated strategies (column 9 vs. column 3): the standard deviations
of estimates based on the moment (in)equality approach are only 1.3 to 1.9 larger than
their truth-telling counterparts.
Reassuringly, the Hausman test rejects truth-telling against stability in exactly 5 per-
cent of samples, which is the intended type-I error rate. This test can therefore serve
as a useful tool to select the efficient truth-telling-based estimates over the less efficient
stability-based estimates when both assumptions are satisfied.
A.11Our stability-based estimator is obtained using maximum likelihood. It can be equivalently obtained
using a GMM estimation with moment equalities defined by the first-order conditions of the log-likelihood
function.
A.12The conditional moment inequalities are derived from students’ observed orderings of all 15 possible
pairs of schools (see Section 2.5). The variables that are used to interact with these conditional moment
inequalities and thus to obtain the unconditional ones are student ability (ai), distance to School 1 (di,1)
and distance to School 2 (di,2), which brings the total number of moment inequalities to 120.
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Table C2: Monte Carlo Results: Unconstrained DA (500 Students, 6 Schools, 500
Samples)
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of
the matching
Stability and
undominated
strategies
True value Mean SD CP Mean SD CP Mean SD CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.94 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.50 0.12 1.00
School 3 1.00 1.01 0.16 0.95 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.00 0.22 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.52 0.15 0.95 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.51 0.21 1.00
School 5 2.00 2.02 0.11 0.95 2.02 0.30 0.96 2.02 0.14 1.00
School 6 2.50 2.52 0.14 0.96 2.54 0.45 0.96 2.53 0.19 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 2.98 0.66 0.95 2.96 2.29 0.96 3.08 0.99 1.00
Distance 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.96 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.02 0.16 1.00
Summary statistics (averaged across Monte Carlo samples)
Average length of submitted ROLs 6.00
Fraction of weakly truth-telling students 1.00
Fraction of students assigned to favorite feasible school 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 5% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 5% significance level).
Notes: This table reports Monte Carlo results from estimating students’ preferences under different sets of identifying
assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling; (ii) stability; (iii) stability and undominated strategies. 500 Monte Carlo samples
of school choice data are simulated under the following data generating process for an economy in which 500 students
compete for admission to 6 schools: an unconstrained DA where students can rank as many schools as they wish, with no
cost for including an extra school in their ROL. Under assumption (iii), the model is estimated using Andrews and Shi
(2013)’s method of moment (in)equalities. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters. The mean and standard
deviation (SD) of point estimates across the Monte Carlo samples are reported in columns 2, 5 and 8, and in columns 3,
6 and 9, respectively. Columns 4, 7 and 10 report the coverage probabilities (CP) for the 95 percent confidence intervals.
The confidence intervals in models (i) and (ii) are the Wald-type confidence intervals obtained from the inverse of the
Hessian matrix. The marginal confidence intervals in model (iii) are computed using the method proposed by Bugni et al.
(2017). Truth-telling is tested against stability by constructing a Hausman-type test statistic from the estimates of both
approaches. Stability is tested against undominated strategies by checking if the identified set of the moment(in)equality
model is empty, using the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015).
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Appendix D Additional Results and Goodness of Fit
Section D.1 of this appendix presents additional results on students’ ranking behavior
(extending Section 4.2 in the main text). Section D.2 describes the goodness-of-fit statis-
tics that we use to compare the estimates of student preferences under different sets of
identifying assumptions (Section 4.4 in the main text).
D.1 Additional Results on Students’ Ranking Behavior
The reduced-form evidence presented in Section 4.2 of the main text suggests that stu-
dents’ ranking behavior could be influenced by their expected admission probabilities, as
the fraction of students ranking a selective school is shown to be close to one for students
with a priority index above the school cutoff, while decreasing rapidly when the priority
index falls below the cutoff.
We extend this analysis by evaluating whether the pattern in Figure 3 is robust to
controlling for potential determinants of student preferences. In particular, since the
decision to rank a selective school might be influenced by the student’s ability, we inves-
tigate whether the correlation between the priority index and the probability of ranking
a selective school is still present once we control for the student’s DNB scores in French
and math.A.13
Specifically, we estimate the following linear probability model separately for each of
the four schools with the highest cutoffs in the Southern District of Paris:
yi,s  δ0 δ1 1tei,s   Psupei,sPsq δ2 1tei,s ¥ Psupei,sPsq δ3 1tei,s ¥ Psu Z
1
i,spi i,s, (A.9)
where yi,s is an indicator function that takes the value of one if student i included school s
in her ROL, and zero otherwise; the coefficients δ1 and δ2 allow the linear relationship
between student i’s priority index at school s (ei,s) and the probability of ranking that
school to differ on either side of the school cutoff (Ps), while the coefficient δ3 allows for
a discontinuous jump in the ranking probability at the cutoff; Zi,s is a vector of student-
school-specific characteristics, which includes the student’s DNB exam scores in French
and math, an indicator for having a high SES background, the distance to school s from
i’s place of residence, an indicator for school s being co-located with the student’s middle
school, and an indicator for school s being the closest to her residence.
A.13Note that students’ DNB scores are different from the academic performance measure that is used
to calculate student priority indices as an input into the DA mechanism (see Appendix B).
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Table D1: Correlation between Student Priority Index and Probability of Ranking the
Most Selective Schools in the Southern District of Paris
Dependent variable: School s is ranked by student
s  School 11 s  School 9
(school with the highest cutoff) (school with second highest cutoff)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Priority index (original scale in points { 100)
(Priority index  school cutoff)1tpriority index   cutoffu 0.549*** 0.428*** 0.430*** 0.381*** 0.213*** 0.236***
(0.052) (0.064) (0.064) (0.073) (0.078) (0.078)
(Priority index  school cutoff)1tpriority index ¥ cutoffu 0.083 0.074 0.074 0.043 0.156* 0.061
(0.077) (0.079) (0.102) (0.077) (0.085) (0.089)
1tpriority index ¥ cutoffu 0.022 0.025 0.015 0.068** 0.058** 0.045*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Student test scores
French score 0.054 0.124 0.153*** 0.524***
(0.050) (0.209) (0.049) (0.202)
Math score 0.179*** 0.370* 0.196*** 0.375*
(0.053) (0.214) (0.051) (0.211)
French score (squared) 0.100 0.388**
(0.167) (0.160)
Math score (squared) 0.254 0.268
(0.173) (0.171)
Other covariates
High SES student 0.094*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.019)
Distance to School (in km) 0.051*** 0.069***
(0.014) (0.010)
Closest school 0.010 0.090***
(0.036) (0.030)
School co-located with student’s middle school 0.014 -
(0.028) -
Number of students 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.132 0.164 0.086 0.108 0.164
F -Test: joint significance of the three coefficients on priority index
F -stat 79.04 18.14 21.48 51.61 10.62 13.32
p-value   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001
Notes: Results are calculated with administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris) for students
from the Southern District who applied for admission to public high schools for the academic year starting in 2013.
Columns 1–3 report estimates from of a linear probability model describing the probability that a student ranks the school
with the highest cutoff (School 11) as a function of her priority index, her test scores in French and math, and additional
student-specific characteristics. Columns 4–6 report estimates for the probability of ranking the school with the second
highest cutoff (school 9). The empirical specification allows for the effect of the priority index to vary depending on whether
the student is above or below the school’s cutoff, and allows for a discontinuous jump in the ranking probability at the
cutoff. French and math scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are
measured in percentiles and normalized to be in r0, 1s. Low-income students are not included in the sample due to the
low-income bonus of 300 points placing them well above the cutoffs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *** p   0.01, ** p   0.05, * p   0.1.
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For reasons of space, Table D1 only reports the OLS estimates of model (A.9) for
the two schools with the highest cutoffs, i.e., School 11 (columns 1–3) and School 9
(columns 4–6). The results for the third and fourth most selective schools (Schools 10
and 7, respectively) yield similar conclusions and are available upon request.
Columns 1 and 4 report estimates of the model without the covariates, Zi,s, and can
be viewed as the regression version of the graphs displayed in the upper panel of Figure 3
in the main text. Columns 2 and 5 add controls for the student’s exam scores in French
and math. Columns 3 and 7 use a more flexible specification that controls for a quadratic
function of French and math scores, and includes the full set of covariates. Note that
low-income students are not included in the the estimation sample for the same reason
as in Figure 3, because the low-income bonus places them well above the cutoff.
Table D1 confirms that the kink-shaped relationship between student priority index
and the probability of ranking the district’s most selective schools is robust to controlling
for students’ academic performance and other observable characteristics. Across all spec-
ifications, the probability of ranking School 11 or School 9 increases significantly with
the student’s priority index, up to the point where the school becomes ex post feasible;
above the cutoff, student ranking behavior is essentially uncorrelated with the value of
the priority index.
Overall, these reduced-form results suggest that students’ submitted choices are in-
fluenced by their priority index, in ways that seem uncorrelated with their underlying
preferences. This type of behavior cannot be easily reconciled with weak truth-telling.
D.2 Goodness of Fit
The goodness-of-fit statistics reported in Panel A of Table 5 in the main text are based
on simulation techniques (Panel A), whereas those reported in Panel B use closed-form
expressions for the choice probabilities (due to the logit specification). We use these
goodness-of-fit measures to compare the predictive performance of the preference esti-
mates obtained under different sets of identifying assumptions.
D.2.1 Simulation-Based Goodness-of-Fit Measures
To compare different estimators’ ability to predict school cutoffs and students’ assignment,
we use several simulation-based goodness-of-fit statistics. We keep fixed the estimated
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coefficients and Zi,s, and draw utility shocks as type-I extreme values. This leads to the
simulated utilities for every student in 300 simulation samples. When studying the WTT-
based estimates, we let students submit their top 8 schools according to their simulated
preferences; the matching is obtained by running DA. For the other sets of estimates,
because stability is assumed, we focus on the unique stable matching in each sample,
which is calculated using students’ priority indices and simulated ordinal preferences.
Predicted Cutoffs. Observed school cutoffs are compared to those simulated using
the different estimates. The results, which are averaged over the 300 simulated samples,
are reported in Table D2, with standard deviations across the samples in parentheses (see
Figure 5 in the main text for a graphical representation).
Predicted Assignment. Students’ observed assignment is compared to their simu-
lated assignment by computing the average predicted fraction of students who are as-
signed to their observed assignment school; in other words, this is the average fraction of
times each student is assigned to her observed assignment in the 300 simulated samples,
with standard deviations across the simulation samples reported in parentheses. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 6 in the main text.
D.2.2 Predicted vs. Observed Partial Preference Order
Our second set of goodness of fit measures involves comparing students’ observed partial
preference order (revealed by their ROL) with the predictions based on different sets of
identifying assumptions. We use two distinct measures: (i) the mean predicted probability
that a student prefers the top-ranked school to the 2nd-ranked in her submitted ROL,
which is averaged across students; and (ii) the mean predicted probability that a student’s
partial preference order among the schools in her ROL coincides with the submitted rank
order. Because of the type-I extreme values, we can exactly calculate these probabilities.
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 6 in the main text.
A-41
Table D2: Goodness of Fit: Observed vs. Simulated Cutoffs
Cutoffs in simulated samples with estimates from
Observed
cutoffs
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of the
matching
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School 2 0.015 0.004 0.024 0.019
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
School 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School 4 0.001 0.043 0.017 0.017
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
School 5 0.042 0.064 0.053 0.040
(0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
School 6 0.069 0.083 0.077 0.062
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
School 7 0.373 0.254 0.373 0.320
(0.020) (0.010) (0.012)
School 8 0.239 0.000 0.241 0.153
(0.001) (0.023) (0.047)
School 9 0.563 0.371 0.564 0.505
(0.033) (0.017) (0.023)
School 10 0.505 0.393 0.506 0.444
(0.029) (0.011) (0.014)
School 11 0.705 0.409 0.705 0.663
(0.040) (0.009) (0.013)
Notes: This table compares the cutoffs, observed for the 11 high schools of the Southern District of Paris in 2013, to the
average cutoffs simulated under various identifying assumptions as in Table 5. The reported values for the simulated cutoffs
are averaged over 300 simulated samples, and the standard deviations across the samples are reported in parentheses. In
all simulations, we vary only the utility shocks, which are kept common across columns 2–4.
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Appendix E Supplementary Figure and Table
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Figure E1: The Southern District of Paris for Public High School Admissions
Notes: The Southern District of Paris covers four of the city’s 20 arrondissements (administrative divisions): 5th, 6th,
13th and 14th. The large red circles show the location of the district’s 11 public high schools (lyce´es). The small blue
circles show the home addresses of the 1,590 students in the data.
Table E1: Assigned and Unassigned Students in the Southern District of Paris
Assigned students Unassigned students
Panel A. Student characteristics
Age 15.0 15.0
Female 0.51 0.45
French score 0.56 0.45
Math score 0.54 0.47
Composite score 0.55 0.46
High SES 0.48 0.73
With low-income bonus 0.16 0.00
Panel B. Enrolment outcomes
Enrolled in assignment school 0.96
Enrolled in another public school 0.01 0.65
Enrolled in a private school 0.03 0.35
Number of students 1,568 22
Notes: The summary statistics are based on administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris),
for students who applied to the 11 high schools of Paris’s Southern District for the academic year starting in 2013. All
scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured in percentiles and
normalized to be in r0, 1s. Enrollment shares are computed for students who are still enrolled in the Paris school system at
the beginning of the 2013-2014 academic year (97 percent of the initial sample). Students unassigned after the main round
have the possibility of participating in a supplementary round, but with choices restricted to schools with remaining seats.
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